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Summary 
The Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict was a prolonged dispute between Russia 
Ukraine on issues in the gas relations between the two countries. This conflict has 
caused several supply disruptions in the supplies to the EU. The supply disruption 
of 2009 was the most in the history of the EU. The goal of this thesis has been to 
analyze if this conflict, has caused a change in EU’s approach to energy security, 
from an internal market perspective, to a security of supply perspective.  
 
The focus of the existing literature is, to a great extent, independently on either 
energy security, the conflict itself or EU’s energy policy. This thesis contributes 
with an analysis of the effect of this particular conflict on EU’s approach to 
energy security, through five causal mechanisms. These five mechanisms are; 
“The New World of Oil”, the Eastern enlargement, the return of Russia on the 
international scene, Gazprom’s goal of global domination and the changes in the 
European utility industry. To analyze the effects, liberal intergovernmentalism has 
been applied as the theoretical framework which has guided the analytical 
process. Rather than to test the theory by this particular case, LI has been applied 
to derive empirical implications for the use in the analysis. These implications, in 
combination with the five mechanisms, have guided the analysis. The data has 
been based on EU documents, documents published by national governments, 
company reports, organizational reports, news articles and scholarly contributions   
 
Based on the findings, the conclusion is that there was a change in approach 
towards security if supply by the turn of the new millennium, as a consequence of 
the changes in the world’s oil market. The Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict 
reinforced this trend. Based on the findings, it seems that the conflict did not 
happen in a vacuum, as s stand-alone event. Rather it may be seen as symptomatic 
for the wider changes in the world’s energy markets. For some Member States, the 
conflict was a wake-up call, as EU’s economic assumptions were challenged. For 
others Member States, it reinforced latent geopolitical interests. Despite increased 
focus on security of supply, the Member States preferences continue to diverge to 
a considerable degree, because of different views on Russia, and because of 
different interpretations of energy as a resource. This divergence continues to be a 
hindrance towards a common energy policy. 
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1. Introduction  
On January 7, 2009, Russian gas exports to 16 Member States of the European 
Union were completely cut off. A commercial dispute between the Russian gas 
supplier, Gazprom and the Ukrainian gas company Naftogaz, was the stated 
reason to the complete cut-off in gas supplies. It took three weeks from the start of 
the crisis, until the Russian gas deliveries were restarted on the 20th of January 
(Pirani, Stern and Yafimava 2009, 4). This was not the first time that Russian 
supplies directed for Europe was cut off, as there were reductions in supplies to 
Europe both in 2006 and 2008. However, the dispute of 2009 was the most serious 
dispute between Russia and Ukraine and also the most serious disruption in gas 
supplies in the history of the EU (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava 2009, 4; SEC 2009, 
7).  
 
There have been different interpretations of Russia’s motives in the gas conflict, 
and whether these are political motivated or not. One who argues that Russia has 
political motives, is Jakub Godzimirski, who argues that Russia is willing to risk 
income from gas exports, to gain something politically (Bakken 2009; 
Godzimirski 2009). Along this line of analysis, Russia can use the “gas weapon” 
as a political tool, and therefore constitutes a larger threat to EU energy security, 
than if the conflict was caused by purely commercial interests. The vast oil and 
gas reserves have been important for the growth of the Russian economy, and as 
Godzimirski argues, these resources have been an important part of Putin’s grand 
strategy to reestablish Russia on the international scene (Godzimirski 2009, 178).  
Russia is an energy superpower,  and it has shown increased willingness to use 
gas as a political tool to manage its foreign relations (Godzimirski 2009, 178;181).  
 
Other scholars argue that there are more important challenges concerning Russian 
energy supplies, than the willingness of Russia to use it as a political weapon 
(Goldthau 2008; Stern 2006b). Following this line of analysis, lack of investments 
in Russian oil and gas fields and inefficient energy consumption in the Russian 
economy, are more prevalent challenges, than the possibility of Russia to use its 
oil and gas resources as a political weapon. Regardless of Russia’s motivations, 
it’s resurgence on the international scene has been dependent on the income from 
the oil and gas sector.  
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The goal of this thesis will be to analyze if there has been a shift in EU’s approach 
to energy security as a consequence of the prolonged gas conflict between Russia 
and Ukraine. Due to the severity of the conflict and its effects on EU’s gas 
supplies, it is likely that it has caused some effects on the EU. The conflict will be 
analyzed through five causal mechanisms. The research has been based on several 
EU documents, documents published by national governments, company reports, 
organizational reports, news articles and scholarly contributions.  
 
The thesis will be divided into chapters. Chapter 2 and 3 are will set the 
framework for the empirical and analytical discussions of chapter 4-8. Chapter 9 
will summarize and conclude the findings.  In chapter 2, the methodological 
approach and the theoretical framework of the thesis, will be presented. I will in 
this section define the two research questions and the different hypotheses. This 
chapter will link the research questions and the research process to relevant 
theoretical contributions, where liberal intergovernmentalism will be the 
theoretical framework that will set the structure of the following chapters.  In 
chapter 3, some background information is provided, both on EU’s history on 
energy policy and some background to the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict. In 
chapter 4, the “New World of Oil” is identified as a mechanism, which has to be 
seen in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict. In chapter 5, the Eastern 
Enlargement is put in the context of EU’s overall approach to energy security, as 
it brought new dimensions into the picture. In chapter 6, the “Return of Russia” is 
analyzed in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict and whether it has 
caused any changes in EU’s approach to energy security. In chapter 7, the role of 
Gazprom and its actions as a state-owned Russian company is investigated. 
Chapter 8 will analyze the effects of the conflict on the European utility industry. 
In chapter 9, I will conclude, by summarizing the causal mechanisms, and whether 
these, in total, have affected a change in EU’s approach to energy security.   
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2. Methodological Approach and Theoretical Framework  
2.1 Research question 
Energy security has increasingly become a topic of research, especially in the last 
decade. Scholarly emphasis has been put on the conflict itself, energy security as a 
concept and EU’s approach to energy security. However, much of the research on 
these topics has been done independently. The goal of this thesis, is combine these 
three elements, and to analyze the effect of the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict on 
EU’s approach to energy security. The conflict is interesting because of its 
severity and the effects it caused. EU’s approach to energy security is interesting, 
as EU’s energy policy can be traced back to the foundations of the EU. The 
conflict illustrates a period when EU’s energy security was challenged, as the 
complete cut-off in supplies had considerable, immediate, negative effects.  The 
goal is therefore to analyze EU’s approach to energy security in the light of the 
Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict.  Based on this, I have formulated the following 
research question: 
Has the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine initiated a change EU’s 
approach to energy security, from an internal market perspective, to a 
security of supply perspective? 
.  
This research question is interesting for several reasons. First of all, it was a 
prolonged conflict between two of the most important energy partners of the EU, 
Russia as supplier and Ukraine as transit country. Also, as Stern points out, Russia 
has historically been a reliable supplier of gas for the EU and the country has 
maintained a “reliable track record” (Ringmar 2005, 19). However, the disruptions 
caused by the conflict may have challenged this view, independent of whether it 
was economically or politically motivated. Furthermore, energy is considered to 
be a strategic resource, which means that it is necessary in the achievement of 
other politico-economic goals, like transportation, economic growth, industrial 
production and ensuring military security (Fermann 2009, 11). In a wider context, 
this means that the inability to ensure energy security may affect almost all other 
sectors in the EU.  
 
Based on the research question, the following hypotheses have been made:  
 
Master Thesis - GRA19003  03.09.2012 
4 
 
H0:  The conflict had no effect on EU’s approach to energy security. 
H1:  The shift from an internal market perspective to a security of supply 
perspective was evident prior to the conflict, and the conflict reinforced 
this trend.  
H2:  The conflict initiated a change in EU’s approach to energy security, from 
an internal market perspective, to a security of supply perspective.   
 
To be a shift towards security supply, there has to be a change in interests on how 
to ensure energy security. An internal market approach will be based on an 
economic approach, based on liberalization, competition, privatization and the use 
of the internal market to ensure energy security. A security of supply approach 
involves greater emphasis on the external dimension of energy security based on 
political and diplomatic skills, diversification in fuels and suppliers and the use of 
foreign policy.  
 
To analyze if here has been a change, I have formulated a second research 
question: 
Through which causal mechanisms may the effect of the Russo-Ukrainian 
gas conflict, on EU’s approach to energy security, be explained? 
To set the conflict in context, I will analyze the conflict through five causal 
mechanisms. The goal is to assess each of the mechanisms, and how these may 
have contributed to affect EU’s policy on energy security. In this way, each 
chapter will involve an independent assessment of each mechanism and if, and 
how, it has affected EU’s approach to energy security.  This will make it possible 
to assess the aggregated effect on EU’s approach to energy security.  
2.2 Research process 
First of all, this study is a case study. To clarify the concept as understood in this 
setting, I will use the definition proposed by John Gerring;  “an intensive study of 
a sin-gle unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” 
(Gerring 2004, 342). In this case, the study will be a within-unit study of the EU 
before, during and after the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict to reach conclusions 
about EU’s approach to energy security, and whether there has been a shift in this 
approach. Following Gerring’s typologies, it will be a case-study of type III, 
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which involves a within-unit study with temporal variation (Gerring 2004, 343).1 
Therefore, other relevant sub-units will be brought into the analysis, as the EU 
consists of several relevant subunits, where the most relevant are the Member 
States.  
 
Based on the research question, the following causal relationship has been 
assumed: 
 
This causal relationship assumes that external factors, as a severe conflict may 
cause changes in EU’s approach to energy security. More specifically, in this case, 
the logic is that the conflict, which may be characterized as an independent 
variable, has initiated a change in the interests of the EU, thus also a change in 
EU’s energy policy, which is the dependent variable. To be a causal effect among 
the two variables, as Gerring is cited in Héritier (2008, 61);“the cause in question 
must generate, create, or produce the supposed effect ”. One approach to think 
about this causal effect, that is, the relationship between variable X and its effect 
on Y, may be found in counterfactual analysis. Identifying the counterfactual 
involved, can be clarifying, which would be the difference with and without the 
exposure to an event or action (King and Powell 2008, 10-11; King, Keohane and 
Verba 1994). In this case the counterfactual involved, would be EU’s approach to 
energy security without the exposure to the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict. In this 
way, the difference between (i) the effect without the conflict (ii) the effect of the 
conflict, is the causal effect.  
 
If one can observe an empirically relationship between a cause and effect, one can 
further investigate through which processes that the variables are linked, which 
will be identifying causal mechanisms (Héritier 2008, 69). In this particular case, 
one can investigate more about the underlying relationship of the effects of the 
conflict, on EU’s approach to energy security: 
                                                 
1 See appendix 1, figure 1, for table with Gerring’s typologies.  
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“(..) The identification of causal mechanisms hap-pens when one puts together 
general knowledge of the world with empirical knowledge of how X and Y inter-
relate. It is in the latter task that case studies enjoy a comparative advantage” 
(Gerring 2004, 348).  
Thus the combination of a theoretical framework and the empirical knowledge on 
the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict, may contribute to explain if and how this 
caused a change in EU’s approach to energy security. The combination of a 
theoretical framework, which will guide which actors to focus on and the causal 
mechanisms, can contribute to give conclusions about EU’s approach to energy 
security. In this way, the study is an interpretive case study, where theory has been 
used as an analytical tool to guide the analysis of the mechanisms at work 
(Vennesson 2008, 226). Therefore, in the next section I will outline different 
theoretical models that could be applied to give guidance to the following 
analysis.  
  
2.3 Relevant Theoretical Frameworks 
As King, Keohane and Verba (1994) and King and Powell (2008) emphasize, 
theory should be applied  to explain and be a guiding analytical tool. The role of 
theory in research is to give general knowledge of the world and from this general 
knowledge derive empirical implications, which should guide the researcher’s 
data collection (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 1-2; King and Powell 2008). 
Following this logic one should aim for the most applicable theoretical framework 
in the use of analysis of the data. 
 
As the goal of this thesis is to empirically analyze if there has been a shift in EU’s 
approach to energy security, I will in this section outline some relevant theoretical 
contributions. It is important to stress that the goal is not to test a theory 
empirically, based on one case, which in any case could be challenging. Rather, 
the role of theory is to be a tool for analyzing the change of EU’s approach to 
energy security in the light of the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict and which 
mechanisms that can contribute to explain this shift. In this way, one should aim 
for the most relevant and applicable theory to be used at the questions at hand. 
The different theories may have varying explanatory power, depending on the 
events, issues at stake and the level of speed of EU integration (Taylor 1996).  
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2.3.1 The Copenhagen School 
One relevant theoretical framework could be the Copenhagen School and its 
approach to security studies. Historically, when issues of security arise, these 
issues have involved the relevance of  military power (Buzan, Wæver and de 
Wilde 1998, 21). However, the traditional view on security has been questioned 
after the end of the Cold War, led by the Copenhagen School (Buzan 1997; 
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998). The Copenhagen School is among the 
wideners, which argues that there are other sectors are relevant, than only military 
material capabilities (Buzan 1997, 5). This theoretical framework is centered on 
identity and ideas and it further involves three subcategories. 
 
Firstly, it involves the aspect of sectors, where there are other sectors that are 
relevant, apart from the military sector (Buzan 1991; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 
1998). These are the environmental sector, the economic sector, the societal 
sector, the political sector and the military sector. The inclusion of other sectors 
than the military sector is the reason why the Copenhagen School is among the 
wideners in security studies.  
 
Secondly, the theory is based on the regional security complex theory which was 
sought to be combined with the widened concept of security (Buzan, Wæver and 
de Wilde 1998, vii). This regional complex theory focus on regions and that such 
regions form subsystems in the international system and that geographical borders 
are characterized by weak interaction (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 41). For example, 
the EU could be interpreted as a region, where its geographical borders are 
characterized by weaker integration.  
 
Thirdly, it involves the aspect of securitization, which might be considered the 
most important concept. Securitization occurs when a securitizing actor claims an 
issue to be a “threat to a referent objective (nation, state, the liberal international 
economic order, the rain forests), which claims to have the right to survive” 
(Buzan and Wæver 2003, 71). This approach is constructivist in nature, in the 
sense that one does not question if it is an actual threat, but it happens “when and 
under what conditions who securitises what issue” (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 71). 
In this way it is in line with the well-known phrase by Alexander Wendt; “anarchy 
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is what states make of it of (Wendt 1992, 395)”. The definition of securitization is 
based on the usage and how the issue is presented, rather than if it is an actual 
threat (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 24). For example, it can be presented as 
it is more important than other issues, or that if it is not tackled, it might be an 
existential threat to the state (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 24). Thus the 
issue can be a perceived threat, and not necessarily be an actual threat, which 
requires that the issue is treated outside the box of normal politics (Buzan, Wæver 
and de Wilde 1998, 24-25).  
 
The Copenhagen School could be applicable to the analysis of the change in EU’s 
focus towards security of supply. Palonkorpi (2007) uses the regional complex 
theory and asses the relevance for energy security, while de Jong, Wouters and 
Sterkx (2009) also mention the concept of securitization in the analysis of EU 
energy security. However the Copenhagen School did not launch energy as a 
separate sector, but rather included it into the economic sector (Palonkorpi 2007, 
3). This can be challenging in an environment where the strategic dimension of 
energy has become more prevalent. 
 
Another reason to why the Copenhagen School may be less relevant as an 
analytical tool in this thesis, is what McSweeney calls the “abandonment of state 
primacy” (1996, 83). This is an important and relevant objection to the application 
of this theoretical framework, because states are dominant with regard to energy 
policy, which also de Jong, Wouters and Sterkx (2009, 34-36) conclude. This is 
both the case within the EU, and outside the Union. Outside the EU - over the last 
decade - there has been an increased state involvement in the energy sector, with 
new NOCs dominating the energy sector. Also, within the EU, national 
governments are unwilling to give up complete sovereignty in the energy sector, 
as identified by the reluctance of Member States to give up security of supply 
policy and the opposition of many Member States toward the unbundling directive 
(EurActiv 2007a, 134-136; Howarth 2009). This suggests that a state-driven 
theoretical approach should be applied.  
 
Furthermore, McSweeney argues that the concepts of interests and legitimacy is 
better analytical concepts for analyzing security than that of identity and societal 
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security, which can be more vague concepts (1996, 90-91). Based on the 
mechanisms identified in this thesis, the concept of interest is more relevant, than 
that of identity and society. This suggests other theoretical contributions to be 
more appropriate, that is, one which incorporates interests into the model. 
Interests vary among states and are dominated by both economic and geopolitical 
considerations. This does not mean that the Copenhagen School is of little or no 
relevance. In fact, the concept of securitization is interesting with regard to energy 
security. However, the mechanism identified points to an interest-driven 
explanation. It can be challenging to combine an interest-driven theoretical 
framework with an identity and society driven framework, as the Copenhagen 
School, especially considering the limited scope of this thesis.  
 
2.3.2 Neofunctionalism 
Another relevant theoretical framework could be neofunctionalism, which is an 
integration theory. This is a theoretical framework which started off with the 
contributions from Ernst B. Haas (1961; 1958) and has been developed by 
Lindberg (1963) and Schmitter (1970), among others. Ruggie et al. (2005) has 
made a review of the theoretical contributions of Ernst B. Haas and argue that it 
can be difficult to classify the theory, as it intersects both elements of international 
relations and comparative politics. The reason to this, they argue, is that it 
emphasizes the relevance of nation states, while it also argues that other, non state 
actors are relevant; “a) the interest associations and social movements that form at 
the regional level, and (b) the secretariat of the organization involved” (Ruggie et 
al. 2005, 278). Schmitter confirms this, and argue that neofunctionalism gives 
importance to non-state actors and the “secretariat” of the regional organization” 
(Schmitter 2002, 2-3). Regional integration may be sporadic and conflictual, but 
in the long run, there will be an increased pressure for the Member States to solve 
problems at a regional level (Schmitter 2002, 3). 
 
To explain the integration at regional level, neofunctionalism uses the concept of 
spillover effects, as the process where actors, in the search for reaching common 
goals, expand into new areas of cooperation (Schmitter 1970, 847). More 
specifically it can be defined as the:  
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“(…) inevitable “spillover” and unintended consequences that occur when states 
agree to some degree of supranational responsibility for accomplishing that task 
but then discover that success also requires addressing related activities” (Ruggie 
et al. 2005, 279).  
 
There are three ways of how spillover can occur. There are functional, political 
and cultural spillovers.  The concept of functional spillover occurs when the 
integration of interconnected economies, requires technical integration in one 
sector which leads to spillover into other related sectors (Sandholtz and Sweet 
2010, 8). Political spillover is the pressure for further integration among the 
involved states. When one sector has integrated, this would cause political 
pressure to integrate other related sectors, as the interest groups involved would 
require this. Cultivated spillover involves the pressure of the European 
Commission to continue integration (Bache, George and Bulmer 2011, 9-10). 
Ruggie et al. (2005, 281) argue that there can be integration towards a common 
energy policy:  
“Only a common energy policy and certain aspects of transport infrastructure 
seem capable of igniting latent functional linkages and generating the unintended 
consequences on which neofunctionalism thrived”.  
In the light of this, one can argue that neofunctionalism could be applied as an 
analytical guide to the research question in this thesis, as it can cause spillover 
from the internal market, to a focus on security of supply.  
 
The authors recognize that the spillovers have managed to affect almost all policy 
areas. However, they also emphasize that there are some parts of EU policy where 
the functional spillover effect may be more difficult (Ruggie et al. 2005, 281). The 
authors acknowledge that foreign policy may be one such policy area, where 
neofunctionalism may experience explanatory problems (Ruggie et al. 2005, 281). 
Security of supply is closely related to foreign policy, thus the concept of spillover 
effects might be inadequate to be used at this area. The divergence in interests of 
Member States, as a consequence of the closeness to foreign policy, may hinder 
the natural spillover into this part of energy policy.  
 
Secondly, and more importantly, the suggested spillover into a common energy 
policy has yet to happen. According to neofunctionalism, the cooperation in the 
internal market should also have caused deepening within the external aspect of 
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energy policy. However, this is not the case, and security of supply, is still at the 
heart of the nation-state. The lack of spillover suggests that the Member States are 
at the controls with regard to energy security. In this way, neofunctionalism may 
not be the best tool available to explain the current state affairs in the EU 
regarding energy security. Neofunctionalism may thrive better under conditions 
where the strategic dimension is less prevalent and where preferences are less 
politicized. Because of this strategic dimension, the Member States are at the 
controls on the development of a common energy policy, and particularly with 
regard to security of supply. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, it is not 
possible to further discuss these aspects, but the mentioned objections suggest that 
one should look elsewhere for a relevant theoretical framework.  
2.3.3 Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
Based on the characteristics of energy policy, one should apply a state-centric, 
interest-driven approach, because, as Belyi argues, Member States are at the 
controls with regard to the objective of ensuring security of supply  (2009, 203-
204). The latest EU regulation on security of supply of gas, also confirms this 
position, as it states the following:  “(…) Member States still enjoy a large margin 
of discretion as to the choice of measures” (EU 2010). This suggests that the 
theoretical framework applied, should have Member States, or governments, as 
the most important actors and how their interests are formed and under what 
conditions they would integrate at the European level. One theoretical approach 
which fulfils these criteria is liberal intergovernmentalism, as it puts the Member 
States and their interests in the forefront of European integration.  
 
LI as a theoretical framework has, to a great extent, been dependent on the 
contributions of Andrew Moravcsik (1993, 1997, 1998). Even though critics have 
argued that LI cannot be applied in everyday decision-making, Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig argue that this is not the case (2009, 73-74). Still they emphasize 
that the theory is best applied on big treaty changes, but I it can still be applied at 
everyday decisions, because many of the decisions within the EU are taken by 
consensus or unanimity (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 74). The first 
assumption it makes, is that actors are rational, which means that states calculate 
the different alternatives and choose the alternative that maximizes utility 
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(Moravcsik 1993, 480; 1997, 517; Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 68). 
Furthermore, LI involves a three-step model, which is summarized by Pollack 
(2010):  
“(1)liberal theory of national preference formation with (2) an 
intergovernmental model of EU-level bargaining, and (3) a model of 
institutional choice emphasizing the role of international institutions in 
providing ‘credible commitments’ for member governments”(Pollack 
2010, 20).  
National Preferences and Energy Security 
The national preference formation is “liberal in inspiration” (Moravcsik 1993, 
483). This means that governments will act based on goals defined domestically 
(Moravcsik 1993, 481). By this, he means that the national preference formation 
of the state, will be dependent on the aggregate of the groups and interests that 
dominate the national sphere of intra-state politics (Moravcsik 1993, 483). He 
summarizes it by: “Groups articulate preferences, governments aggregate 
them”(Moravcsik 1993, 483). The aggregated preferences can be based on either 
economic or geopolitical considerations, which will affect the external policies of 
the Member States (Moravcsik 1998, 23-28). Moravcsik argues that, in EU’s 
history, economic interests have been dominant for integration, but he also 
emphasizes that geopolitical interests may play an important role (1998, 474). For 
example, in some states, the economic interests may dominate the approach to 
energy security, while in others the geopolitical interests may be more prominent. 
Following this assumption, it is the interest of the governments with regard to 
energy security that becomes analytically interesting. One has to aim to identify 
the interests of the Member States on energy security, and try to analyze if the 
Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict, through the identified causal mechanisms, has 
changed these interests. The preferences of the states are not given, and may vary 
among states, within states and across issues (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 
2009, 69). The empirical implication of this, with regard to energy, is that the 
preferences on how to ensure energy security may vary among the Member States 
and within individual Member States over time. The factors that affects this 
preference formation, are both national as well as international (Moravcsik 1993, 
483). 
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Divergence in the preferences on energy security, may be a hindrance to 
integration, and may lead to the lack of integration. Oppositely, convergence in 
preferences may be a driver for integration. Member States can interpret energy 
differently, as it can be interpreted either in economic or in geopolitical terms. 
This thesis will try to identify the interests of the Member States and analyze 
whether the mechanisms have changed their preferences on energy security and 
based on this make an overall assessment of the position of the EU on energy 
security.  
Intergovernmental bargaining 
Furthermore, states use institutions as tools to reach their goals by 
intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining (Moravcsik 1993, 480-481; 
Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 68). As Moravcsik argues, states will have 
an incentive to engage in transnational cooperation, if such cooperation will 
increase the possibility to control national policy outcomes (Moravcsik 1993, 
485). This often arises when such cooperation can reduce negative externalities 
that arise from the international system (Moravcsik 1993, 485). With regard to 
energy security, it is logical to assume that the Member States will increase 
integration at the EU level, if this makes it easier to ensure energy security at the 
national level. Oppositely, if such cooperation will have a negative effect, or no 
effect on ensuring energy security, the incentive to cooperate is less present.  
 
The outcome of negotiations depends on the relative bargaining power of the 
involved actors (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 71).There are different 
mechanisms that can affect the bargaining position. In the negotiation process, 
asymmetrical independence, which is defined as the uneven distribution of utility 
from an agreement, plays an important role, because the actors that have least to 
gain from an agreement, have a stronger bargaining position. The actors compare 
the agreements within the institution to other arrangements, like unilateral 
agreements (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 71). This is particularly 
relevant with regard to security of gas supply, as the gas market, still is, regional, 
where long-term, bilateral agreements are dominant. Therefore, the Member 
States will compare unilateral agreements with suppliers, with the overall 
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approach of the EU. If an actor has most to gain from the unilateral agreement, it 
has a strong bargaining position in the negotiations on a common security of 
supply policy. If Member States are satisfied with their unilateral agreements, the 
incentive to cooperate at the EU level is less present.  
  
Institutional choice 
The third aspect is the inclusion of institutional choice. Institutions can be the 
tools of member states to cope with unpredicted and unforeseen challenges 
(Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 72). Institutions contribute to reduce the 
transaction costs of continued negotiations on specific issues and ensure credible 
commitments of the pre-existing bargain (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 
72; Pollack 2010: 20).  When bargains have been made and the Member States 
have struck an agreement, institutions are used to ensure that commitments are 
held, and to secure the agreements they have made (Moravcsik 1998, 20). With 
regard to energy security, this can involve the pre-existing emergency measures of 
the Member States in the case of a supply disruption and to ensure that these are 
credible.   
Empirical Implications 
As Schmitter writes: “any comprehensive theory of integration should potentially 
be a theory of disintegration” (2002, 4). This implies that a theory which explains 
European integration, also should have capability to explain why there is a lack of 
such. This is where I consider LI to have a strong advantage, as it explains 
integration on the basis of the Member States. As energy policy is still at the heart 
of the nation state, the Member States dictate how much competency that is left to 
the EU. If it has been a shift towards security of supply, one has to analyze the 
effect of the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict on the Member States. If there has been 
a shift towards security of supply, this does not necessary imply increased 
integration towards a common security of supply policy within the EU, as the 
Member States might still be reluctant to transfer competencies to the EU. Based 
on the theoretical model of LI, there some empirical implications that will guide 
the analysis:  
 Economic and geopolitical interest will dominate the preference 
formation on how to ensure energy security.   
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 Divergence in preferences on how to ensure energy security may 
hinder integration towards a common energy policy.  
 Convergence in preferences on how to ensure energy security may 
increase the possibility of integration.  
 There have to be changes in the preferences of the Member States on 
how to ensure energy security to have a shift in EU’s approach to 
energy security.  
 Member States which favors unilateral deals with supplier countries, 
may have a stronger bargaining position and see a common EU energy 
policy as less attractive compared to unilateral deals.   
 
Without making any further theoretical discussions, it is important to have the 
above-mentioned empirical implications in mind during the next chapters. These 
empirical implications combined with the five mechanisms will be the foundation 
of the analysis of EU’s approach to energy security.  
 
2.4 Energy security 
I have already mentioned the strategic dimension of energy and how ensuring 
energy security is necessary to achieve other politico-economic goals. A strategic 
resource can be cumulative, that is, with the resource, it becomes easier to 
accumulate other resources (Fermann 2009, 11). It can also be defined as those 
resources that are particularly important within one historical era, to ensure socio-
economic development (Fermann 2009, 11). To achieve energy security is not an 
end, in its own right, but rather a mean to achieve other important politico-
economic goals and to advance national power (Fermann 2009, 22; Kalicki and 
Goldwyn 2005, 9).  A broad and widely accepted definition of energy security 
will involve sufficient supply of energy at a reasonable price (de Jong, Wouters 
and Sterkx 2009, 4; Yergin 2006, 70-71; IEA 2012).  
 
However, the above-mentioned definition focuses only on the supply side of 
energy. Additionally, it is also possible to divide the concept  of energy security 
into security of demand and security of supply (Fermann 2009, 24-25). Security of 
demand involves the security concerns of oil and gas exporting countries, like 
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Russia and Norway,  that need a constant flow of exports at high enough prices 
for energy resources (Fermann 2009, 25). In relation to the EU, it is the security of 
supply perspective of energy security that is the most relevant, because the EU is 
import dependent. This can also be illustrated by the lack of reserves within the 
EU. At the end of 2011, the EU has 0.4% of the world’s oil reserves and 0.9% of 
the world’s gas reserves and 2% of the world’s oil production and 4, 7 % of the 
worlds gas production (BP 2012). Especially oil and gas play an important role in 
the energy mix of the EU, where oil has a share of 52,3 % and gas has a share of 
24,5 % as of 2009 (Eurostat 2011). Due to the lack of physical access to these 
resources, much of it has to be imported. Of this, the EU imports about 60 % of its 
gas and 80% of its oil. The dependence on imported oil and gas is also projected 
to increase to 90% for oil and 80% for gas in 2030 (EurActiv 2011). The 
dependence on imported energy resources, can have serious negative implications 
for the EU, as price hikes and disruption in supplies can directly affect the 
achievement of other politico-economic goals.    
 
The threats towards security of supply can be short-term and long-term (Austvik 
2009, 88). Short term risks involve disruptions in supply or the transit of supplies, 
due to political factors, disasters and extreme weather conditions(Austvik 2009, 
88). The long-term risks are related to the challenges of future supplies and if it’s 
enough to cover growing demand, for political or economic reasons (Austvik 
2009, 88). Sensitivity and vulnerability are concepts introduced by Keohane and 
Nye (1989), which can describe the ability to tackle supply risks. Sensitivity 
involves disruptions in existing supplies; while vulnerability involves mostly 
demand issues in long term gas supplies (Austvik 2009, 89). There are some 
differences between oil and gas, due to the structure of the two markets. As 
Noreng (2006, 38) points out, throughout the turbulences in the oil market, the 
commodity is always supplied, at a price, which makes the risks in the oil market 
most related to price. The challenge with ensuring gas security of supply is that 
the supply still is, to a large extent regional, in contradiction to oil, where there is 
an integrated world market. Therefore the risks related to gas concern both price 
and volumes, because a disruption in the gas market, may cause a direct reduction 
the volumes supplied (Correljé and van der Linde 2006, 38; Noreng 2006). This 
was strongly illustrated in the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict.  
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3. Background 
3.1 The Development of EU Energy Policy  
The history of EU energy policy can be traced back to the ECSC. France, 
Germany, Italy and the BeNeLux-countries wanted to control the resources 
important to the war industries, namely coal and steel to ensure peace in Europe 
(de Jong 2008, 95; Romanova 2009, 119). However, already in the beginning of 
the 1960s there were diverging interests among the Member States. Belgium and 
Germany wanted to diversify away from coal, while France and the Netherlands 
saw the opportunities in the oil and gas sector (de Jong 2008, 96). Energy was 
important during the 1970s as a consequence of the oil crisis, but after the crisis of 
the 1970s, the energy question was absent for some years. The question returned 
in the latter part if the 1980s, when the Brundtland Commission put the focus on 
the environmental aspects of energy and in 1988, the Commission launched the 
report Towards an Internal Energy market (de Jong 2008, 97-98) . In this paper, 
the Commission acknowledges that there have been few developments within the 
field of energy policy the last 20 years and it argues that there should be 
established an internal market for energy (COM 1988, 3).  
 
3.2 The 1990s as the End of History? 
In 1989, after the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama argued that the western ideology 
of capitalism and democracy had won, that communism had lost and asked if the 
world had seen the “End of History”. From his point of view, a consequence of 
the victory of western ideology, would be that there would occur a “Common 
Marketization” of world politics (Fukuyama 1989, 22). With the working 
document Towards an Internal Energy market, the goal was to establish an 
internal energy market. An internal market for energy would have several positive 
effects, like reduced costs, increased competitiveness of the European industries 
and it could also increase the security of supply (COM 1988, 5-6). When the EU 
established the Single European Market in 1992, actors hoped this introduction 
would also cause liberalization and influence of economic principles in the gas 
markets, thus having the same logic within the gas sector (Andersen and Sitter 
2009, 63). The internal market would increase the flexibility of the industry and in 
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this way increase the resources available in the case of emergency (COM 1988, 
6).  The focus on security of supply was followed up by the working document 
Working Paper of the Commission on Security of Supply, the Internal Energy 
Market and Energy Policy published by the Commission (1990). The concept of 
security of supply is here defined as:  
“Security of supply means the ability to ensure that future essential energy 
needs can be met, both by means of adequate domestic resources worked 
under economically acceptable conditions or maintained as strategic 
reserves, and by calling on accessible and. stable external sources 
supplemented, where appropriate, by strategic stocks” (SEC 1990, 6).  
 
The security of supply aspect is also emphasized in the Commission’s green paper 
of 1995, For A European Union Energy Policy. In this paper, ensuring security of 
supply is mentioned as one of the challenges facing the Union (COM 1995, 22-
26).  Based on these reports, one can identify the aspect of security of supply in 
the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. However, security of supply is mostly 
interpreted within the internal market framework, in the sense that increased 
competition, infrastructure and cooperation within the European Union can have 
positive effects on security of supply.  
 
As Andersen and Sitter put it, the focus on liberalization of European energy 
markets was a consequence of changed international climate together with more 
normalized supply situation (Andersen and Sitter 2009, 69). The process started in 
the beginning of the 1990s, where the focus was on liberalization, transmission, 
distribution and storage of natural gas (Claes 2009:46).  The goal of the 1990s 
was on economic integration, which involved merging national markets into a 
single European market for energy. The European Union and its liberal ideology 
with its focus on the internal market was in many ways the manifestation of 
Fukuyama’s prediction of the “End of History” (Fukuyama 1989).  
 
Claes (2009) argues that to have an energy policy, one has to consider both 
internal and external factors. One needs to differentiate between internal aspects, 
which are targeted by competition policy and the functioning of the internal 
market and external aspects where security of supply is achieved through political 
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and diplomatic skills (Claes 2009, 37;43). According to Claes, rather than having 
an energy policy, the EU had developed a competition policy applied to energy  in 
the 1990s (2009, 42). This is at its best an incomplete approach to energy policy. 
Based on this short presentation of the history of EU’s energy policy, one can 
summarize EU’s energy policy in the late 1990s as: 
- Dominated by the focus on the liberalization of the energy sector with the 
directives on electricity and gas (EC 1996, 1998).2  
- The EU did not have a complete energy policy, but rather a competition 
policy applied to the energy sector. 
- Security of supply is to a great extent interpreted within the internal 
market context.  
3.3 The 2000s and the Three Challenges of Energy Policy 
Today, EU’s policy on energy can be characterized as three-dimensional; (i) the 
internal market, (ii) security of supply and the (iii) environmental dimension. de 
Jong suggests that there is a conflictual relationship between these three 
dimensions (2008, 107)3. The triangle is interesting, because it describes the 
relationship between the internal market as illustrated by “Lisbon”, security of 
supply as illustrated by “Moscow” and climate illustrated by “Kyoto”. This 
relationship  is to some extent conflictive, because Member States are unwilling to 
completely give up their external energy interests, which mostly relates to security 
of supply (de Jong 2008, 108).  
 
The historical focus of the EU has been on the “Lisbon” dimension, with its focus 
on competition and liberalization. However, such an approach comes is 
inadequate when there are external factors, as illustrated by “Moscow”, that 
dominate EU’s energy security  As the supply is located outside the free-market of 
the union it becomes a foreign policy and an important political topic (Claes 2009, 
48). The goal of the following chapters is to analyze if there has been a shift in 
focus towards “Moscow” and the security of supply aspect.  
                                                 
2 The directive on electricity came in 1996 and the directive on gas came in 1998. 
3 See appendix 1, figure 2, for de Jong’s triangle of the three challenges.  
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3.4 Russo-Ukrainian relations 
As both economies struggled after the fall of the Soviet Union, cheap, subsidized 
Russian gas was crucial to the Ukrainian economy, while the gas export to Europe, 
through the Ukrainian transit network, was a necessity for the Russian economy 
(Pirani, Stern and Yafimava 2009, 5). During the 1990s the relationship was 
characterized by discussions on the issues of the level of debt, delivery reductions and 
diversion of gas made by Ukrainian actors (Stern 2006b, 2). In the summer of 2004 it 
seemed like the involved actors had reached an agreement and a way of dealing with 
the gas trade the next 5-10 years (Stern 2006b, 2-3). However, with the Orange 
Revolution and the election of  Victor Yushchenko there were dramatic changes in 
Russo-Ukrainian gas relations, as Yushchenko and his allies followed a more pro-
western foreign policy, which had a negative effect on the gas relations  with Russia 
(BBC 2010; Stern 2006b, 3-4).  At the end of 2005, before the outbreak of the crisis 
of January 2006, Putin stated that there was a serious crisis in the relations between 
the two countries (BBC 2005a).  At the same time, the increasing energy prices 
caused problems as the difference between European prices and the prices for CIS-
countries increased (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava 2009, 7).  
 
Ukrainian actors refused to increase the level to European market prices, which 
caused Gazprom to cut off gas supplies to Ukraine, on January 1, 2006 (Stern 2006b, 
7). EU member states, as Poland and Hungary, noticed reductions in supplies on the 
same day and Gazprom blamed Ukraine steeling gas meant for European customers 
(BBC 2006b). Four days later, on January 4, an agreement was made between Russia 
and Ukraine with an average price for 95$/mcm instead of the suggested 230/mcm 
(BBC 2006a).  Even though an agreement was made after the dispute of 2006, the 
conflict was not settled, as European gas prices continued to rise.  
 
In March 2008 there were disagreements again on several aspects of the previous 
arrangements, which caused Gazprom to reduce the supplies for Ukraine (Pirani, 
Stern and Yafimava 2009, 12). Naftogaz threatened to divert gas meant for the 
European market, but an agreement was settled without any greater effects on EU 
Member States (Reuters 2008a, 2008b). The troublesome relationship continued and 
got worse at the end of 2008. This can be illustrated by the statement made by Putin, 
who was cited on the following in December 2008; "If our partners do not fulfill 
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agreements, we will have to reduce supplies. What else can we do?" (RIA-Novosti 
2008).  
 
One important aspect was the inability of Naftogaz to repay debt for earlier gas 
deliveries and Gazprom and Alexei Miller stated that if no agreement was made on 
the matter, the prices paid by Ukraine would be increased to 400/mcm (Pirani, Stern 
and Yafimava 2009, 15-16; Wagstyl and Olearchyk 2008).  The conflict escalated to 
its most serious point and from January 1, 2009,  Gazprom cut all supplies for 
Ukraine (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava 2009, 19). While in 2006 the conflict would be 
over by January 4, it escalated from this point and by January 7, there was a complete 
cut-off in supplies to some European countries which were 100% dependent on 
Russian gas (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava 2009, 20-22; EurActiv 2009b). The gas flow 
was restarted on January 20, ending the most serious supply disruption in the history 
of the EU.  
 
3.4.1 The Immediate Effects on the EU 
Due to its extent, the crisis of 2009 had serious negative implications. The gas 
reductions affected EU member states differently, and the degree of sensitivity varied 
across Member States. Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia were the hardest hit among 
EU member states (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava 2009, 53; Kovacevic 2009, 2-3)4. 
Slovakia is dependent on gas for electricity generation, and the disruption in supplies 
strained the network (SEC 2009, 15). Bulgaria and Romania are sensitive to 
disruptions in the gas supplies from Russia, due to the high import dependence. 
Because of high sensitivity, the consequences were larger in these countries. The 
disruption in gas also showed weaknesses in the energy infrastructure, because the 
system was already working at full capacity (Kovacevic 2009, 18). However, 
Kovacevic argues that even though the situation was difficult in the region, many of 
the countries were “lucky” because domestic demand was lower than usual due to 
holiday season and the financial crisis,  while the hydropower production was large 
due to weather conditions(Kovacevic 2009, 18-19). 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 See appendix 1, figure 3 for an overview of the effects of the supply disruption of 2009.  
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4. The New World of Oil 
4.1 The 1990s and the Absence of the Strategic Dimension 
Oil has had a dominant role in international politics because of its strategic 
characteristics. The decision of Winston Churchill, to change the fuel of the Royal 
Navy from coal to oil, in the naval build-up before World War I, may be seen as a 
turning point in this regard (Yergin 2006, 69). By changing the fuel for the whole 
navy, its functioning became dependent on securing imports of oil from the 
Middle East (Yergin 2006, 69). In this way, securing energy supplies became not 
only a part of securing sufficient oil supplies, but also a matter of national 
security. Hundred years later, oil and politics are still closely related and the black 
gold’s strategic dimension makes it an indispensable commodity for any modern 
society. 
 
Despite the strategic dimension, oil was seen as any other commodity during the 
1990s and was interpreted in economic terms. As Yergin emphasizes, after the 
Cold War, oil was on the agenda due to the environmental dimension, but apart 
from that, it had become rather unimportant, the strategic dimension had been 
downplayed and oil was seen as any other commodity (2008, 1006). This 
optimistic view was challenged by the Gulf War in 1990-91, which caused oil 
price hike as consequence of fear, anxiety and geopolitical tensions (Yergin 2008, 
1012). However, the optimistic view returned after the Gulf War ended, because 
of an optimistic world environment, which caused the strategic dimension of oil to 
be removed for much of the 1990s (Yergin 2008, 1025). The salience of oil was 
low, as prices moved towards 10$, which caused an absence in the focus on 
energy security (Yergin 2008, 1026).  
 
The absence of the strategic dimension of oil during the 1990s can explain EUs 
focus on the internal market and the liberalization paradigm. As the interest of the 
Member States are influenced by external factors and internal factors, the 
international environment in general and the world’s energy markets in particular 
did not require a focus on security of supply. As Yergin points out, the low oil 
price was similar to a large tax cut for the oil importing nations of Europe, and in 
this way reduced inflation (Yergin 2008, 1025). For 15 years before the terrorist 
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attacks of 9/11, the oil consuming countries, like the Member States of the EU 
were able to take out economic rents from cheap access to oil (van der Linde et al. 
2004, 45). The price of oil ranged between 15$-20$ much of the time from 1985 
and onwards, which has been a contributing factor to the absence of security of 
supply in this period (Franssen 2002, 58). Because of the stability of the oil price 
combined with a favorable oil market for importing countries, policymakers in the 
EU did not pay much attention to security of supply (Franssen 2002, 59). The 
interpretation of this in the EU context, may be that the favorable oil market for 
the EU’s Member States, may have given the Union the possibility to focus on the 
internal aspects of energy security, like competition policy, liberalization and 
infrastructure. The external dimension of EU energy policy was less prevalent, as 
there were abundant supplies at affordable prices, with fewer geopolitical 
tensions. The absence of the strategic dimension in combination with the general 
liberalization paradigm of the Union, can contribute to explain why the Member 
States applied a competition policy to energy, rather than to have a complete 
energy policy, during the 1990s.  
 
4.2 Tightened Oil Market 
The beginning of the new millennium saw the return of the focus on oil, energy 
security and security of supply. The beginning of the 2000s marked a bull market 
in commodities in general, which also included oil. In 1999 the price of crude oil 
was around 12 dollars a barrel while it in 2008 was short of 150 dollars, which 
was a record high (CRB 2006, 28T; IEA 2011, 40). As of today, the oil price has 
stabilized around 100 dollars. The changes in the market for oil can be attributed 
to both economic and geopolitical factors.  
 
Jim Rogers (2005) identifies this trend in his book Hot Commodities where he 
argues that this bull market has been caused by structural changes in supply and 
demand in the world’s commodity markets. One can point to several reasons for 
the sharp rise in oil price, but the growth of China and other emerging markets 
combined with economic growth in western economies are the most evident 
factors (Yergin 2011a, 160-164; CRB 2006, 28T). This is what Daniel Yergin 
calls the “Demand Shock” (2011a, 159). On the supply side, the oil supply has not 
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been able to keep the pace with the increase in demand (CRB 2006, T28). In this 
way, the combination of increased demand - especially driven by China’s hunger 
for oil - combined with lack of supply to keep the pace with demand, caused new 
dynamics in demand and supply. These elements have contributed to a tightened 
market, which have caused an upward trend in the oil price. 
 
A dramatic increase in the oil price will directly affect the “affordability” aspect in 
security of supply. Due to its strategic dimension, the increase in oil price will 
affect many other aspects of the modern society and it will also have a negative 
impact on economic growth (Noreng 2009, 222). When the oil price advances 
from 12 dollars to short of 150 dollars, which is more than a tenfold increase in 
the price, this will automatically increase the focus on security of supply. In the 
same way as the cheap oil price of the 1990s was similar to a tax reduction for the 
Member States, causing oil to be characterized by low salience, the oppositely 
happened with the increase in oil price. It was experienced as a tax rise, which can 
explain the demand for reduced taxes on fuels in the Member States (EurActiv 
2000).  
4.3 Geopolitical Tensions  
Yergin, who is one of the most prominent scholars within the field of energy 
security, has argued that the challenges with regard to energy security and security 
of supply, will be political, rather than technological (2006, 2011b). Van der 
Linde et al. also follow this line of analysis and argue that political risk factors 
will threaten the markets over the next years (van der Linde et al. 2004, 46-48). In 
addition to the tightened world market, the oil price has been affected by 
geopolitical events, such as terrorism, the war in Iraq and other political events, 
which have contributed to the sharp rise in the oil price (Noreng 2009, 69-70; 
Yergin 2006).  A turning point with regard to geopolitical events may be the 
terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001.  These attacks 
introduced a more challenging geopolitical climate. Geopolitical tensions 
continued and caused international crisis on the US-UK lead war in Iraq, where 
the competition for oil resources may have been an important factor (van der 
Linde et al. 2004, 49). One can in light of this argue that there has been a new 
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politicized global environment, where geopolitical interests have claimed a larger 
role, which has had an effect on the focus of the Member States.   
 
Another relevant aspect in this regard, is that oil and gas production and reserves 
are to a greater extent located outside the EU. Even though the world is still 
running into oil, and reserves continue to rise, the challenge is that the production 
of such oil will be outside the OECD-area and the importance of OPEC is 
predicted to increase (van der Linde et al. 2004, 53-55). Oil was therefore again a 
matter characterized by high salience in the start of the 21st century. EU’s growing 
dependence on imported oil makes the Union more vulnerable to external risk 
factors, of which it has not capabilities to control, which will affect the Union’s 
energy security. The external dimension of EU energy security was made highly 
visible in the entrance of the new millennium due to rising prices, tightened oil 
market and geopolitical tensions. 
 
4.4 The New World of Oil and the Effects on the EU Actors 
From the empirical findings in this chapter, it becomes clear that there have been 
structural changes in the world’s oil market over the last 15 years, and that these 
changes contributed to surge in oil price. Thus, given these changes, the next 
interesting question is how these changes affected the relevant EU actors, and 
whether these changes can strengthen any of the three hypotheses.  
 
4.4.1 The European Commission 
As mentioned in the background, the 1990s was dominated by the idea of the 
internal market. This also included the European Commission. However, the 
changes that occurred at the end of the 1990s might have caused a change in focus 
of the European Commission. This change in evident in the green paper Towards 
a European strategy for the security of energy supply, where the rising oil price 
and the increased import-dependence, are mentioned as challenges for the EU 
(COM 2000, 2-3). In this paper, the Commission also emphasizes that the EU has 
no real energy policy, that there has been no common approach to security of 
supply, and that this is a hindrance in the bargaining process at the world market 
(COM 2000, 3;28).  
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Thus it was a shift towards security of supply, in the sense that the Commission 
acknowledges the external dimension of EU’s energy policy and that there have to 
be some developments in EU’s approach to deal with these challenges. However, 
the economic assumptions of the Commission continued, and the emphasis is still 
leaned more towards the importance of liberalization and markets. Thus the 
concept of security of supply became more important, but the Commission’s 
approach was still based on economic assumptions. One may question if the 
Commission would have given priority to security of supply, if the oil market of 
the 1990s would have continued? Probably not, as the dramatic increase in oil 
price made the external dimension of EU energy policy clearly visible, in a similar 
way as the 1973 oil crisis.  
 
4.4.2 The Member States 
First of all, the effect of the “New World of Oil” is that it has caused trend shift, 
which involves a shift of power in the market, from the consuming states, like the 
Member States of the EU to the producing states. Since the new millennium the 
market climate has favored producing states like Russia. In this way, the 
producers may extract economic rents from the market, and not the consuming 
states. In general, this causes security of supply to become a more important topic.  
 
Secondly, the effect of the “New World of Oil” on the Member States, has been 
that the geopolitical dimension in ensuring energy security has become more 
prevalent. In a world where geopolitical tensions to a greater extent dominate the 
energy market, security of supply becomes a more relevant and important tool to 
ensure energy security. This effect can be seen in for example, the UK 
government’s Energy White Paper of 2002, with the title Our energy future: 
creating a low-carbon economy. In this report, the Government emphasizes the 
increased importance of political influence to ensure energy security, as the UK 
will become a net importer of energy (DTI 2002, 9-10). In UK, the increased 
focus on security of supply, was a consequence of internal (decline in indigenous 
energy production) and external factors (changes in the oil market), but still based, 
to a great extent, on market principles. In a world where geopolitical 
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considerations claim a larger role, the strategic dimension of energy becomes 
more important. Germany drafted its energy policy in the year 2000 with the 
“Energy Dialogue 2000”, where energy security was mentioned, together with 
environmental concerns and economic efficiency as top three objectives (Geden, 
Clémence and Maurer 2006, 9). 
 
Thirdly, the external dimension of the Member States energy mix has become 
more prevalent, compared to the 1990s. For example in France, the dramatic 
increase in oil price from 1999 an onwards brought energy back in the box of high 
salience, which can be illustrated by the blockades by road haulers in the country 
(EurActiv 2000). Thus one can argue that oil was put back in the box of high 
salience, as a consequence of the dramatic surge in oil price, as a skyrocketing oil 
price challenges the affordability aspect in security of supply. This dimension is 
external, and cannot be ensured through the internal market. The skyrocketing oil 
and geopolitical tensions have illustrated the limitations of an incomplete energy 
policy.  
4.5 Conclusion: The Return to History? 
While the 1990s was characterized by the “End of History” and an era of 
liberalization and integration, the 2000s was in many ways a “Return to History”, 
with increased geopolitical tensions. The changes in the oil market challenged 
both the economic and geopolitical interests of the Member States of the EU, as 
the “The New World of Oil” favors producers rather than consumers. Would the 
there have been an increased focus on security of supply, if the oil market of the 
1990s had continued? Most likely not, as all the actors mention oil market 
developments as an important reason to focus on security of supply. The overall 
effect was that both the European Commission and the Member States put 
security of supply – as a concept – on the agenda. France, with a strong historical 
focus on energy security, the UK and Germany all put focus on security of supply 
in the start of the new millennium. According to LI, both internal and external 
factors will affect the preferences of the Member States. In this case, the changes 
in the external dimension of EU’s energy security – the dependence on the 
imported fuels – challenged the interests of the Member States, and required them 
to increase the focus on security of supply.  
Master Thesis - GRA19003  03.09.2012 
28 
 
5.  The Eastern Enlargement and Energy Security 
5.1 Eastern Enlargement 
On May 1, 2004, 10 new countries joined the European Union, which were the 
Central European countries; Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, together with Malta and Cyprus. It marked the 
largest enlargement in the history of the EU, both in terms of number of countries 
and in terms of population. With the enlargement came also new challenges and 
relationships, as many of these countries had historically been in the Russian 
interest sphere. The Eastern enlargement came in a period with increased 
geopolitical tensions and increased oil and gas prices, which eventually would 
bring up the “gas question”. To identify the different views, after the enlargement, 
one can use the typology of Leonard and Popescu (2007, 1-2), as they identify 
five approaches towards Russia: 
- Trojan horses (Cyprus and Greece) who often defend Russian interests 
- Strategic partners (France, Germany, Italy and Spain 
- Friendly pragmatists (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia) 
- Frosty pragmatists (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, 
the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom) 
- New Cold Warriors (Poland and Lithuania) 
 
As Correljé and van der Linde (2006, 532-533) argue, the enlargement caused 
new security of supply patterns to emerge. Firstly, the eastern enlargement 
brought new dependencies on Russian gas into the EU. Many of these states are 
more sensitive to supply disruptions in Russian gas, than many of the old Member 
States. The higher sensitivity of these countries was strongly illustrated during the 
gas crisis of January 2009. Secondly, enlargement brought new interests on 
Russia into the picture. As Finon and Locatelli (2008, 426) argue, the interests of 
Member States often diverge, and do so to a greater extent after the arrival of the 
new Member States. At the same time, there is a growing urgency for a common 
external energy policy with the arrival of these Member States as they are more 
dependent on Russian gas (Finon and Locatelli 2008, 427). I will in the next 
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section identify the interests of the UK, France, Poland and Germany to illustrate 
the differences among the Member States.  
5.2 National Policies 
5.2.1 The UK 
The UK has been in favor of liberalization of energy markets within the EU and 
was in favor of the directives to liberalize the electricity and gas sectors (Howarth 
2009, 134; Andersen and Sitter 2009, 80). In 2002, in a comment on the green 
paper of the European Commission on security of supply of 2000, the British 
parliament emphasized that the UK is also a part of the European trend of 
becoming more dependent on external suppliers (Parliament 2002). The UK has 
chosen a diversification of fuels rather than suppliers and has a strong bilateral 
relationship with Norway, which has made it independent in its security of supply 
policy (Geden, Clémence and Maurer 2006, 21).  
 
In 2006, in a report, the British Parliament mentioned two important energy 
challenges for the UK, which were: (i) the increasing challenge of climate change 
(ii) the increased dependence of UK on imports to ensure energy needs (DTI 
2006, 10). In this document, the UK government identifies both the “demand 
shock” as a challenge towards the world’s oil and gas markets together with the 
increased importance of the strategic dimension of energy (DTI 2006, 10-11). 
Because of the higher dependence on the external energy sources, the security of 
supply dimension has increased in importance during the last ten years. The UK 
government has projected that imports of natural gas can reach 90 % in 2020, and 
supplies to a greater extent will involve imports not only from Norway, but also 
Russia, Algeria and Qatar (DTI 2006, 77-78). Despite having increased focus on 
security of supply, the UK still put most emphasis market-based mechanisms of 
investments, liberalization and competition, but increasingly also emphasize 
diplomatic tools like building stronger bilateral political relationship (DTI 2006, 
18-19). The UK also sees a greater role of coordination on the EU level with 
regard to security of supply, but still wants to remain sovereignty on the matter 
and are unwilling to transfer too much power to EU institutions (Geden, 
Clémence and Maurer 2006).  
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5.2.2 Poland 
Until 1996, Poland’s gas imports came only from one supplier, which was the 
Soviet Union and after its dissolution, Russia (Heinrich 2007, 18). In 2010, 30 % 
of the gas consumption in Poland was covered by the PGNiG’s own production, 
while the rest was ensured through imports, of which 90% came from Gazprom 
(PGNiG 2011, 29;41). With the inclusion of Poland into the EU, came new 
dimensions into EU energy security. Geopolitical considerations are more 
dominant in Poland’s approach to energy security, compared to other Member 
States. There is an extreme political sensitivity in Poland regarding Russian gas 
and because of this, the country wants to diversify away from Russian gas 
supplies (Stern 2005). 
 
Poland is the biggest new comer and it can to a certain degree be representative 
for the CEE-countries and the Baltic states. Miller identifies Poland “A Regional 
Leader on Energy Security” among the CEE countries (Miller 2008, 16). Leonard 
and Popescu (2007) put Poland together with Lithuania among the New Cold 
Warriors, which have negative political relations with Russia. Recently, Lithuania 
has launched the plan for a LNG-terminal to diversify away from Russian gas and 
Gazprom (Lannin and Adomaitis 2012). The main objective for Poland with 
regard to its security of supply policy, is the diversification away from Russian 
gas imports (Geden, Clémence and Maurer 2006, 9). Poland’s interests with 
regard to Russia may diverge from the old Member States, in the sense that the 
dependency on Russian gas should be reduced, because Poland is opposed to the 
Russian domination on European energy markets. With regard to a common 
security of supply, Poland is positive  as this can contribute to balance the power 
of Russia, and the country wants the EU to help it defend Polish interests (Geden, 
Clémence and Maurer 2006, 25).   
 
5.2.3 Germany 
Historically, security of supply in Germany has been left to the private companies, 
which have tried to limit diversification, to strengthen their role in the market 
(Geden, Clémence and Maurer 2006, 14). Thus one can argue that, Germany’s 
assumptions on energy have to a great extent been dominated by economic 
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considerations, at least prior to the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict (Umbach 2006, 
64-65). German companies have a strategic interest in the relationship with 
Russia, as it is seen as a stable supplier of gas, while for Russia and Gazprom, the 
relationship can help the company to expand into the European market (Westphal 
2008, 102).   
 
The dependence on Russian gas has not been seen as a disadvantage. Rather 
German companies have seen the interdependence between Germany and Russia 
as an advantage, as Germany has an unrivalled relationship with Russia among the 
Western European countries (Geden, Clémence and Maurer 2006, 17). Thus the 
strong bilateral relationship between Germany and Russia is the most important 
aspect in Germany’s security of supply policy. As Westphal argues, Germany has 
focused on bilateral relationship, rather than multilateral solutions and bypassed 
the EU-Russian dialogue, as the country has developed the German-Russian 
strategic partnership (Westphal 2008, 111-112). This exclusive energy alliance to 
some extent undermines the common security of supply of the EU. For Germany, 
a common external energy policy may be unattractive, if it involves challenging 
the role of Russia, as the country values its strategic relationship with Russia. It is 
also important to mention that Germany has involved itself in the process of a 
more coordinated external energy policy, even though it has been reluctant 
transfer competencies to the EU (Geden, Clémence and Maurer 2006, 25).  
 
5.2.4 France 
The energy mix of France is different from the other mentioned Member States, 
by the fact that it relies on nuclear power in combination with imported fossile 
fuels. France has used nuclear energy to diversify its energy mix, away from 
fossile fuels like oil and gas. As Geden, Clémence and Maurer (2006, 4) argues, 
France is interesting because it has been a driver for an external European energy 
policy, despite the country’s conservative view on security interests. In France, 
there has been a high degree of state involvement into the energy sector and 
security of supply is one of four goals in the energy policy (IEA 2010, 15). France 
was one of the eight Member States that were opposed to the unbundling directive 
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and have historically been a slow liberalizer and stuck to the minimum 
requirements (Howarth 2009, 134-135).  
 
France is dependent on natural gas for 15% of total energy production, with 97 % 
coming from imports on long-term contracts. The gas imports originate from four 
major suppliers, which are Norway (32%), the Netherlands (18%), Algeria (16%) 
and Russia (15%) (IEA 2010, 57-58). The energy mix of France has the same 
tendency as other EU Member States, with its reliance on imported fossile fuels. 
The focus of France has been the aim for energy independency, and has over the 
last years been positive to a more coordinated external energy policy for the 
Union, however this should happen with the Member States at the controls 
(Geden, Clémence and Maurer 2006, 15). 
 
5.3 The Enlargement and the Effects on EU’s Approach to Energy Security 
Out of the presentation of the four countries one can make some general remarks 
about their approach to energy security. All the Member States presented here, see 
a role of a more coordinated EU approach to security of supply, but at the same 
time, they are reluctant to transfer considerable competencies to the EU. The 
differences in the Member States energy mix and the different interests with 
regard to how to ensure security of supply make this understandable (Westphal 
2008, 98). Energy policy is still at the heart of the nation state, because as 
Westphal puts it, security of supply is a national sensitive policy (2008, 98). 
Furthermore, the eastern enlargement, here represented by Poland, may have 
caused two interesting effects: (i) increased divergence in interests on how to 
ensure energy security which has caused the Union to become more 
heterogeneous and (ii) brought the question of energy security on the agenda.   
 
The interpretation of energy as a resource differs among the four Member States. 
In UK and Germany, energy is largely defined by economic interests, as 
liberalization is important in the UK, while the private companies have had an 
important role in Germany, based on strong cooperation with Gazprom. Contrary, 
France and Poland interpret energy more in a strategic context, and the state is 
more involved. Despite the increased focus of the Member States on matters of 
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security of supply, there has been lack of transfer of sovereignty from the Member 
States to the European Commission on external aspects of security of supply. The 
Eastern enlargement have made the EU more heterogeneous which makes it more 
challenging to reach common solutions on how to ensure energy security. In this 
way, just by the inclusion of new Member States, there has been increased 
divergence in the preferences of the Union.  
 
The lack of integration within this policy area can be well explained by LI, as this 
really shows that the Member States are the speed-setters with regard to 
integration on a common energy policy. For example, Germany and Poland have 
opposite interests with regard to Russian supplies, the former sees Russia as a 
strategic partner, while the latter sees Russian supplies as a threat to its energy 
security. In addition, these two countries have a different interpretation of energy 
as resource, as the geopolitical dimension is more prevalent in Poland’s 
preferences on energy. This divergence is might be a barrier to integration 
according to the LI framework.  
 
The divergence in interests makes it difficult for Member States to establish 
credible commitments at the EU level, as they are unwilling to make large 
compromises due to the strategic dimension. For example, Germany and the UK 
have strong bilateral arrangements, Germany with Russia, and the UK with 
Norway. These Member States have a strong bargaining position in EU 
negotiations, as their bilateral relationship may be more attractive than the 
common EU approach. Therefore, the different national policies and the disunity 
makes it difficult to hand the necessary competencies to the EU (Larsson 2006, 
183).  
 
5.4 Conclusion: A More Heterogenous EU 
The trend among all of the mentioned Member States is that the concept of 
security of supply has received more attention, as they face the same trend with 
increase dependence on imported energy. Therefore they see a role of a more 
coordinated approach. The security of supply question has also become more 
important after the enlargement, as the new comers are more dependent on 
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Russian gas supplies. This suggests a drive towards a common security of supply 
policy. However, there is also the opposite trend of diverging interests on how to 
secure these supplies, due to national variances in the energy mix, combined with 
different preferences on the role of Russia in this energy mix. The preferences 
diverge to a greater extent after the Eastern enlargement, as the enlargement has 
caused a more heterogeneous EU. The national variances among the Member 
States cause them to be reluctant to give up their sovereignty in security of supply, 
and unwilling to transfer competencies to the EU. A more heterogeneous EU can 
be a hindrance to integration towards a common energy policy. 
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6. Russia’s Return to the International Scene 
6.1 The New World of Energy and the Return of Russia 
From the end of the Soviet Union until the financial crisis of 1997 to 1998, the 
Russian GDP decreased with approximately 40 % (Blakkisrud 2009, 2). It all 
culminated in 1998, when Russia was bankrupt as a consequence of the financial 
crisis that struck several economies in 1997-1998 (Yergin 2008, 1033). At the 
same time, as the country was struggling, the old Soviet oil industry had been 
transformed. By 1998, the Russian oil industry had been transformed from a 
system based on central planning, to a system with vertically integrated 
companies, based on the western model (Yergin 2011a, 32). With the election of 
Putin, came a man that was convinced that the role of Russia’s energy resources 
was necessary in Russia’s recovery to become an economic power (Yergin 2011a, 
37; Blakkisrud 2009). 
 
The new millennium did not only see a surge in the oil price, but also the 
resurgence of Russia on the international scene. The boom in oil and gas prices 
from 1998 and onwards, lead to an average growth rate of 7 % per year from the 
new millennium to the financial crisis, which hit the world in autumn of 2008 
(Blakkisrud 2009, 2). As a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
production of Russia decreased, but regained its strength towards the end of the 
1990s, and grew by 50% in the first half of the 2000s (Yergin 2008, 1030). In ten 
years after the financial crisis of 1997-1998, due to the enormous income from the 
energy exports, Russia had managed to save up almost 800 billion dollars in 
foreign currency savings and investments (Yergin 2008, 1033). This dramatic 
change explains the importance of the revenues from oil and gas exports and how 
Russia was in a completely different situation in the 2000s compared to the 1990s.  
 
6.2 An Energy Superpower 
Godzimirski argues that oil and gas resources have been seen as strategic 
resources, which have caused Russia to minimize foreign involvement in the 
energy sector: ”The new Russian legislation on subsoil resources and on strategic 
sectors of Russian economy seems to strengthen the state’s role and control over 
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the country’s most important natural resources (2009, 179)”. The strong focus on 
the energy sector and the relationship between the state and the energy companies 
has been important for the revival of Russia on the international scene. Russia’s 
foreign energy policy strives to reduce the dependence on third parties or transit 
countries in the deliveries of energy exports, and geopolitical considerations 
overshadow everything in the planning of new projects (Larsson 2006, 174). The 
Russian state is a dominant actor in the energy sector, especially with regard to 
gas, and there is a symbiotic relationship between the Russian state and the 
companies (Bilgin 2011, 119). In many ways the changes in the oil markets have 
made Russia an energy superpower, where the strong state intervention in the 
energy sector is an important aspect of Russia’s return on the international scene 
(Finon and Locatelli 2008, 425). Helm argues that Russia has followed a strategy 
to maximize the rents from oil and gas resources, renationalizing the energy sector 
(2007, 38).  From 1998 to 2009, energy commodities as a part of total export, rose 
from 41,5 % to 75,1% in 2009, which confirms the importance of energy exports 
for the Russian economy (Godzimirski 2009, 178). 
 
6.3 New Dynamics  
Coinciding with the increasing oil and gas prices, and the incomes from the 
energy sector,  came a more challenging relationship between Russia and Ukraine 
on gas relations (Stern 2006a, 6). The challenge for Russia has been that it is 
dependent on Ukraine for the gas deliveries for Europe, since 80 % of the gas 
exported to Europe, is exported through Ukraine (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava 
2009, 5). One possible explanation to the conflict, was the Orange revolution in 
Ukraine, which elected the new president Yuschenko, which caused a more 
challenging relationship between Ukraine and Russia (Yergin 2011a, 337). In 
many ways the Russo-Ukrainian crisis of January 2006 confirmed the trend in the 
international energy markets of increased tensions (Geden, Clémence and Maurer 
2006, 2). In any case, there was a new dynamic in the Russo-Ukrainian relations, 
which was a contributing factor to the gas conflict.  
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The revival of Russia did not only change the dynamics of Russian-Ukrainian 
relations, but also the dynamics of EU-Russian relations.  Russia’s role as an 
energy superpower seems to have given Russia increased confidence, which has 
caused the country to increasingly define the rules of the game  (Leonard and 
Popescu 2007, 7).  As EU Member States fail to coordinate their policies towards 
Russia, Moscow has not only gained influence over the EU, but also within the 
EU through its relations with key Member States (Leonard and Popescu 2007, 
16). For many Member States, the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine of 
January 2006 was a wake-up call, as it illustrated the vulnerabilities in the EU’s 
external energy dimension (Geden, Clémence and Maurer 2006, 9). Today, Russia 
sets the agenda and has gained power as a consequence of soaring oil and gas 
prices (Leonard and Popescu 2007, 7). The heavy increase in oil prices also 
affected gas prices for the supplies to Europe, as the gas prices paid for Russian 
gas is calculated from a formula based on the price of oil (Pirani, Stern and 
Yafimava 2009, 7).  
 
As Geden, Clémence and Maurer point out, the increased dependence on Russian 
imports combined with increased supplies from state-owned companies, have 
caused the EU Member States to seek common solutions (2006, 2). Despite this 
trend, it has been difficult for Member States give up sovereignty on the matter 
and transfer competence to the EU (Geden, Clémence and Maurer 2006, 3-4). The 
focus on a more coordinated security of supply policy is a consequence of the goal 
to ensure energy security, which in today’s environment cannot be ensured, only 
through the internal market (Geden, Clémence and Maurer 2006, 9).  
 
6.4 The Return of Russia and the Effects on the EU Actors 
As the return of Russia on the international scene may have been a contributing 
factor to the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict, it becomes interesting to analyze the 
effects on the EU actors and their approach to energy security. The return of 
Russia may be seen as an external mechanism, which has affected the EU 
Member States. First of all, the return of Russia illustrates the general trend that 
oil and gas reserves are located outside the OECD-countries and the wider 
changes in the world’s energy markets, which are more favorable to producer 
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states. The return of Russia confirms the trend of the changing energy markets in 
the 2000s, as the producer states are able to take out economic rents, as outlined in 
the “New World of Oil” chapter.  
 
Secondly, the effect of the return of Russia is that it has highlighted the different 
approaches to the organization of the energy sector. Russia’s approach is based on 
strong state involvement, while EU’s approach is based on interests of 
interdependence, liberalization and cooperation (Bilgin 2011, 120). Due to the 
important role of Russia in the European energy mix, many Member States have 
to deal with Russia. One of the challenges that the EU faces, and which the Union 
has realized with the return of Russia, is the difference between the liberalization 
paradigm of the EU and the state-centric strategy of Russia (Bilgin 2011, 119). As 
gas contracts still are based on long-term agreements, between individual Member 
States and Russia, the return of Russia and its strong state involvement, makes it 
stronger vis-à-vis Member States in these negotiations.  
 
Another important effect, is that, during the gas conflict, many actors were taken 
by surprise by the willingness of Russia and Gazprom to risk their reputation as 
stable suppliers to European consumers  (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava 2009, 4). 
Regardless of being an economic or political motivated conflict, the Russo-
Ukrainian gas conflict challenged the reputation of Russia as a stable energy 
partner. For many EU actors, the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict served as a wake-
up call. As Umbach (2010, 2006) points out, the return of Russia and the gas 
conflict with Ukraine have challenged EU’s assumptions about energy and energy 
markets. Traditionally, energy has been interpreted more as an economic good 
than a strategic one, private utility companies have been used to achieve energy 
security and Russia has been seen as a stable supplier (Umbach 2010, 1230; 2006, 
64). It is likely that economic interests were more prevalent during the 1990s, 
which is logical when one takes into the consideration that the oil and gas markets 
made it possible for the EU to take out economic rents. Because of the recurring 
supply disruptions, the strategic dimension and the security of supply aspect have 
become more relevant. This means that geopolitical interests to a greater extent 
dominate the considerations of the Member States.  For the EU, the concept of 
security of supply is a more important concept in the 2000s compared to the 
Master Thesis - GRA19003  03.09.2012 
39 
 
1990s, much because the of the supply disruptions caused by the Russo-Ukrainian 
gas conflict. The increased awareness of value coordination may be a direct 
consequence of the fact that the EU has to deal with a strong supplier, Russia, 
which has based its energy policy on strong state involvement. Member States 
have started to recognize the important link between security of supply and energy 
security, much because of the increased involvement of state into energy markets, 
which they are facing in the Russian case (Geden, Clémence and Maurer 2006, 
10). Despite increased attention on security of supply, both at the EU level and in 
the Member States, there are diverging interests regarding Russia, and the conflict 
may have reinforced these diverging interests (Geden, Clémence and Maurer 
2006, 18).   
 
6.4.1 European Commission 
Three months after the first serious disruption in the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict, 
in 2006, the European Commission published the Green Paper, A European 
Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy. In this paper,  the 
Commission admits that the EU has entered a new energy area (COM 2006, 3). 
To strengthen energy security, the Commission suggests a common external 
security of supply policy (COM 2006, 14-17). This paper, which argued to speak 
with one voice, was welcomed by Member States, as these are to a greater extent 
facing the same problems, which are high prices for oil and increased dependence 
on Russian gas (Geden, Clémence and Maurer 2006, 14).  
 
6.4.2 Poland 
One of the countries that have a more negative approach towards Russian energy 
supply, is Poland. Contrary to the Commission, Poland has held a more political 
approach to the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict.  One explanatory factor is its 
geopolitical position between Russia and Germany, which makes the country 
more sensitive to Russian expansionism (Heinrich 2007, 22). Two examples that 
symbolize this difficult relationship, are Poland’s negative attitude towards the 
Nord Stream gas pipeline and the use of “militaristic rhetoric” during the Russo-
Ukrainian gas crisis of 2006 (Heinrich 2007, 85). Poland also blocked the new 
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initiatives for partnership agreements between the EU and Russia after the crisis 
of 2006 (Heinrich 2007, 85).  
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the strategic dimension is more prevalent in 
Poland’s definition of energy security. Miller argues that over the last years, there 
has been increased divergence in the interests of the CEE countries with regard to 
energy security and the dependence on Russian gas (2008, 37). This is what he 
refers to as the “energy security schism”, which involves the different 
interpretation of energy security among the CEE states (Miller 2008, 37). Thus the 
Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict may have reinforced the strategic dimension in 
Poland’s definition of energy security. In this way, Poland may have become even 
more negative towards the Russian gas supplies, as a consequence of the Russo-
Ukrainian gas conflict. Because of this, security of supply has become an even 
more important topic for Poland, as a consequence of the conflict.  
 
6.4.3 Germany 
Germany and Russia have had a strong bilateral energy relationship. For 
Germany, it has been important to develop the bilateral relationship with Russia.   
As Westphal (2008, 93) argues, this might have bypassed the EU-Russian 
dialogue. The relationship is based on economic cooperation and trade, and 
Germany have had a tendency to favour economics over politics (Westphal 2008). 
The strong bilateral relationship in the gas markets can be exemplified by the 
Nord Stream project. During Chancellor Schröder’s time in office there was a 
close relationship between Germany and Russia, also in energy relations, much 
due to his personal relationship with President Putin (Westphal 2008, 105). 
 
For Germany, the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict was a wake-up call, and the 
conflict has challenged the view of Russia as a stable energy supplier. 
Furthermore, the election of Merkel may also have caused a more balanced view 
on Russia. Immediately after the conflict of 2006, Chancellor Merkel saw the 
need for Germany to draft a “national energy strategy”, with increased focus on 
security of supply, as a consequence of the supply disruption (Benoit 2006; Stern 
2006b, 16). In this way, the concept of security of supply based on foreign policy, 
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was not emphasized until the Russo-Ukrainian crisis of 2006 (Geden, Clémence 
and Maurer 2006; Umbach 2006, 64-65). 
 
6.4.4 Other Member States  
Many of the new Member States are also the ones that argue for a smaller market 
share of Russian gas in European markets, like for example  Poland, Lithuania, 
Estonia, Romania and the Czech Republic (Miller 2008, 15). Relations between 
Poland, Lithuania and Latvia on the one side, and Russia on the other, became 
more complicated during the Nord Stream project, as the former countries asked 
the EU for help to rather build a pipeline network through their territories 
(Heinrich 2007, 45). There has been an increased drive towards a more 
coordinated external energy policy. UK, France, several Central European states 
and the Baltic states have argued for a single negotiator with external suppliers of 
energy, mostly because of Russia (Finon and Locatelli 2008, 423-424). The drive 
to focus more on security of supply policy has been reinforced by the return of 
Russia and the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Especially for the Baltic 
states and the CEE- countries, there has been an increased focus on the 
geopolitical dimension of energy. Thus also security of supply has become more 
important, as they see dependence on Russian gas as a threat to their energy 
security.  
 
6.5 Conclusion: The Wake-Up Call 
During the 1990s, Russia was of limited importance. Much because of the 
challenges it faced during this decade. However, the return of Russia and the 
Eastern enlargement have caused new dynamics in EU-Russian relations. Russia’s 
backing of Gazprom during the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict has reinforced the 
focus on security of supply in the new Member States, notably in Poland and 
Lithuania. The conflict retriggered geopolitical considerations, which historically, 
have played a major role in these countries. The importance of geopolitical 
considerations is the reason to why they want to limit the dependence on Russian 
gas. For the old Member States, the resurgence of Russia and its position in the 
gas conflict has served as a “wake-up call”. Despite this, the preferences on 
Russia still vary greatly, which is best illustrated by the divergence in interests of 
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Germany and Poland. The former has a strategic partnership and values economic 
cooperation, while the latter has a negative approach based on geopolitical 
interests. This divergence continues to be a hindrance to integration of a common 
EU energy policy. Lastly, the European Commission has had an economic 
interpretation of the conflict, which considerably deviates from Poland’s view of 
the conflict.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master Thesis - GRA19003  03.09.2012 
43 
 
7. Gazprom – an Energy Giant in the Making? 
7.1 A Solid Track Record 
Gazprom was established after the Soviet era. The Russian state is the majority 
owner, and the company pays taxes equal to 15% of the Russian state budget 
(Yergin 2011a, 335). The revenues from the company are an important 
contributor to the Russian state budget. Historically, Russia and Gazprom have 
had a solid track record of expansion of deliveries, and have been able to increase 
the deliveries from 20 bcm per year in 1977, to 40 bcm per year in 1990 to 100 
bcm per year in 1995, 140 bcm in 2003 and 157 bcm for 2011 (Bilgin 2011, 120; 
Gazprom 2012a, 74)5.  
 
Gas exports to Europe have gone through pipelines. For Russia and Gazprom 
there are two important aspects in this regard (Stern 2005, 109). Central Asian 
exports must  pass through Russia, which makes Gazprom having control of 
supplies, and historically the disruptions caused by inability to pay, of customers 
like Ukraine and Belarus, have been important for why Gazprom has aimed for 
ownership in the transit networks (Stern 2005, 67). Since the break-up of the 
Soviet Union, Gazprom has aimed for diversification away from Ukraine, as the 
country was not longer a part of the Soviet Union and the energy relations among 
the actors have been challenging (Stern 2005, 97).  
 
7.2 Gazprom’s Global Ambitions 
“We would like to transform our company from being the world's leading gas 
company into a world leading energy company”, Alexander Medvedev, the 
deputy chairman stated in an interview in December 2005 (Moore 2005). 
Gazprom has, based on its own figures for 2011, 15% of the world’s gas 
production and 18 % of the proven reserves (Gazprom 2012a, 15). In the middle 
of 2008, the stock market capitalization of Gazprom was $300 billion, which 
made it the third largest company in the world, based on this measure (Yergin 
2011a, 335). The goal of Gazprom is to became a leading energy company, and 
                                                 
5 See appendix 1, figure 4, for map of Gazprom’s exports to Europe.  
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move away from being a Russian gas utility. This goal can be illustrated by the 
strategic vision in their annual report for 2011: 
“OAO Gazprom’s strategic goal is to establish itself as a leader among global 
energy companies by diversifying sales markets, ensuring reliable supplies, 
increasing operating efficiency and using scientific and technical potential” 
(Gazprom 2012a, 12) 
 
In addition, Gazprom has tried to move into the downstream sector in Europe. 
This can be illustrated by the establishment of “trading houses” throughout 
Europe, through the 1990s (Stern 2005, 112). The new millennium also meant the 
introduction of a stronger Gazprom, along the lines of the general trend in the 
energy markets, with strong, state-owned oil and gas companies. One aspect in 
this regard, was the change in strategy towards the CIS-countries. In the 2000s the 
strategy of Gazprom has been to secure long-term contractual relationships with 
national companies. The reasons to the change in strategy, are the following:  
- reduce the role of intermediaries  
- collect payment for debt and non-payment  
- move away from subsidized prices 
- reinforce Russian foreign policies in the countries (Stern 2005, 106)  
 
While the 1990s was characterized by disengagement in the trade with the CIS-
countries, the beginnings of the 2000s was one of reengagement. Jonathan Stern 
(2005) points to several reasons to why Gazprom took back the trade with the 
CIS-countries in the beginnings of the 2000s. This change in strategy can be 
attributed to the arrival of the new Putin administration and the change of the 
Gazprom management in 2001, which introduced goals that were closer to that of 
the government (Stern 2005, 105). Furthermore, the change in Gazprom’s supply 
position has made imports of Central Asian gas more important, while the CIS-
countries have experienced economic growth (Stern 2005, 105). In this way, the 
CIS-countries have become more attractive as profitable customers.  
 
7.3 Challenging Transit Relations 
One of the challenges for Gazprom and its European customers,  has been the 
problems experienced with transit countries, such as Ukraine (Stern 2005, 141). 
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Stern argues that the crisis of 2006 marked a shift in strategy from Gazprom, 
where the company aimed for increase in the profitability of CIS-customers (Stern 
2006a, 17).  In 2006, as part of their renewed strategy, Gazprom required that the 
prices which Ukraine paid for gas should be raised to European levels, from $50-
80/mcm to $160-230/mcm (Stern 2006b, 6). This price increase was backed by 
the Russian government and president Putin stated that if Ukraine agreed to pay 
the price, the increase could in the second quarter of 2006 (Stern 2006b, 7; BBC 
2005b). The political leaders on both sides were involved to find a solution to the 
crisis, and Putin was ready to give Ukraine the sufficient loans to finance the 
transfer to market prices (BBC 2005a).  
 
Because of the troubles with the transit countries, Gazprom has tried to gain 
ownership in the Ukrainian transit network, but this has failed, which has caused 
Russia to focus on alternative pipelines projects, that shall avoid Ukraine (Pirani 
2009, 109). This can support the argument that Ukraine is perceived as a difficult 
transit country and that gas reductions have been used to (i) to obtain ownership in 
the Ukrainian transit network, to control the necessary resources, (ii) to get 
Ukraine to pay for obtained debt due to unpaid gas bills, to secure income during 
the financial crisis and (iii) to increase Ukraine’s gas prices closer to the European 
prices, to increase Russia’s benefits from the dependency. There has been a 
change in Gazprom’s strategy through the 2000s and the strong state involvement 
in the company, makes it difficult to completely set aside political motivations. 
Many European actors were taken by surprise by Gazprom’s willingness to use 
gas reductions as a tool to manage the difficult transit relations with Ukraine. The 
changes in Gazprom’s strategy, its global ambitions, the close relationship with 
the Russian state and the willingness to put strong measures behind the his 
strategy, have challenged the assumptions of EU and its Member States. In many 
ways, the emergence of Gazprom as a dominant gas company illustrates the 
renewed strength of Russia.  
7. 4 Gazprom’s Global Ambitions and the Effects on the EU Actors 
7.4.1 The European Commission 
The Commission continued to have an economic approach to the conflict, and 
stated that it was a purely commercial dispute between Naftogaz and Gazprom. 
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This approach is strongly evident in The January 2009 Gas Supply Disruption to 
the EU: An Assessment, where it states the following: “Although the disruption 
was a commercial matter between Gazprom of Russia and Naftogaz of Ukraine 
(…)” (SEC 2009, 2). After the conflict of 2009 came a new directive regarding 
security of supply of gas, however in this directive, a lot of discretion is still 
handed to the Member States (EU 2010). This shows that it is an increased focus 
on security of supply, but that the Member States are unwilling transfer 
competencies to the EU Commission.  
 
7.4.2 The Member States 
The gas disruptions of 2006 and onwards have made the EU and its Member 
States open their eyes. First of all, the most important consequence of the Russo-
Ukrainian gas conflict has been that the reputation of Gazprom as a stable supplier 
has been challenged, maybe irreparably. Several EU actors were been taken by 
surprise by Gazprom’s willingness to use gas reductions as a tool in dealing with a 
difficult transit partner. As Yergin argues in his article, diversification is the most 
important tool in ensuring energy security (Yergin 2006). This involves 
diversification in suppliers, transit countries and fuels. The gas conflict between 
Russia and Ukraine, was a lesson to learn for the EU, as it illustrated that several 
of the Member States are sensitive to supply disruptions, due to overly 
dependency on one supplier, Gazprom and one transit country, Ukraine. Thus the 
change in strategy of Gazprom towards the CIS-countries with its goal to increase 
the profits of these markets, combined with the willingness to use strong measures 
to achieve this, may have been a contributing factor to the increased focus on 
security of supply in the EU.  
  
The EU and its Member States have, to a great extent, been stuck to an economic 
definition of energy, and not put as much emphasis on the strategic dimension 
(Umbach 2010, 1230; 2006, 64). This is particularly true for many of the old 
Member States. Contrary, Russia, with its strong links to Gazprom, has to a 
greater extent operated under the interpretation of energy as a strategic resource, 
where resource nationalism has been important to build up the Russian energy 
industry (Bilgin 2011, 120; Godzimirski 2009, 178-179). The crisis of 2009 
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illustrated how the Russian government and Gazprom work together, as the 
strategic directions came from Putin (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava 2009, 31). In 
this regard, Gazprom’s monopoly plays a key role. Thus there is a mismatch of 
assumptions and as well interests. To let Russia access WTO, the EU wants 
Russia to reform its energy markets and make them more liberalized. However, 
this is unlikely, because, as Aalto and Westphal (2008, 13) argue, breaking up 
Gazprom’s monopoly would remove the possibility for the Russian government to 
use it as a policy tool. The Union fears an increased mismatch between the 
liberalization paradigm of the Union and the resource nationalism of Russia 
(Bilgin 2011, 119). Furthermore, the economic importance of Gazprom, and also 
its strategic and political importance, make the Russian state unwilling to 
liberalize the gas sector (Bilgin 2011, 121). There is a natural clash of interests 
between the EU and Gazprom. The EU is import- dependent and wants to ensure 
security of supply, while Gazprom, which is export- dependent wants to ensure 
security of demand. As Stern points out, the change in commercial strategy 
towards the CIS-countries may cause other customers to become as profitable as 
the European customers (Stern 2006b, 17). In such a case,  the scenario may 
become that rather than Europe assessing the dependence on Russian gas, 
Gazprom may find more profitable customers closer to home (Stern 2006b, 17).  
 
Gazprom has been trying to invest in European market, based on its goal to have a 
stronger presence in the European market, although the company has experienced 
modest success (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava 2010, 29). This can be called 
Gazprom’s downstream diversification, where Gazprom is moving into EU 
Member States to take part in the liberalization and privatization of the markets 
(Finon and Locatelli 2008, 434-435).  This have caused opposition in the EU 
Member States, as Gazprom is increasing its presence and market power in 
European countries (Finon and Locatelli 2008, 434-436; Pirani, Stern and 
Yafimava 2010, 29). One direct effect of this, has been the aim for EU actors to 
limit the dominance of Gazprom in the European market, by the “Gazprom 
clause”, which involves that companies from third party countries, had to operate 
under the same rules as EU companies (EurActiv 2007b).  
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Furthermore, Gazprom has been blamed for a divide-and-rule-game, in the sense 
that it wants to discuss contracts with each, individual Member States and the 
relevant companies. Gazprom continues to prefer to long-term gas contracts 
(Finon and Locatelli 2008). As these long-term contracts continue to dominate 
negotiations, these may make it easier for Gazprom to apply its divide-and-rule 
game. One example of this divide-and-rule game, may be the Nord Stream 
pipeline. This pipeline makes Russia and Gazprom less dependent on transit 
countries like Ukraine and Poland. For Poland, as a transit country for Russian 
gas, the Nord-Stream pipeline has been seen as a threat to the country’s energy 
security, as it fears that Gazprom can pressure for higher prices and transit fees 
(Westphal 2008, 109). To illustrate the Polish opposition to this pipeline, it was  
compared to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, agreed upon at the eve of the Second 
World War (Westphal 2008, 113). This illustrates how Gazprom, as a supplier, 
has different interests than Poland, as an importer, and how the former tries to 
diversify away from the latter.   
7.5 Conclusion: The Turning Point 
The Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict showed Gazprom’s new strategy towards the 
CIS-countries. The most important part of this strategy was the drive to increase 
the profitability of those markets. In this regard, the conflict served as a turning 
point. The most important effect of the conflict was that Gazprom showed the 
willingness to go through with gas reductions and defend their position. The 
willingness to defend their position so strongly caused several EU actors to 
question the dominant role of Gazprom in EU’s energy mix. Diversification away 
from Gazprom gas became a theme, and caused a reinforced focus on security of 
supply in the EU. The conflict and the strong relationship between the Russian 
state and Gazprom have illustrated a mismatch in interests between the EU 
countries and Russia and Gazprom. In many ways, the strengthened role of 
Gazprom, its close links to the Russian state, and its willingness to defend its 
interests, characterize the general trend in world’s energy markets, with the shift 
in the balance of power towards the producing states and the NOCs. Had the ties 
between the Russian government and Gazprom been weaker, it is questionable if 
the conflict would have had the same effect on Russian’s reputation as a stable 
energy supplier.  
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8. The European Oil and Gas Industry 
8.1 The Challenge by the New Seven Sisters 
After the Second World War, the Anglo-Saxon oil companies dominated the oil 
market. The Italian visionary, Enrico Mattei, wanted to establish the Italian oil 
company ENI among those companies, and in his challenge of the cartel of 
Anglo-Saxon oil companies, he coined the term, “The Seven Sisters” (ENI 2012; 
Yergin 2008, 656). These companies dominated the oil market in the post-war 
period, but the developments of the oil market in the 1990s caused a consolidation 
in the industry. After this consolidation, at the end of the 1990s, the “The Seven 
Sisters” - through mergers and acquisitions - had become the “Four Supermajors” 
of BP, Exxon, Chevron and Royal Dutch Shell. These companies, together with 
the European utility industry are facing new challenges as a consequence of the 
changes in the energy markets.  
 
There are two trends that are worth explaining with regard to the European oil and 
gas industry. Firstly, the external changes in the oil and gas markets, which affect 
the European oil and gas companies. The theme of The Price is the power struggle 
over oil resources and that the balance of power shifts between consumers and 
producers, and that now there has been a shift towards the producing states 
(Yergin 2008, 1032-1033). The start of the 2000s has also seen a shift, not only 
from the oil consuming states to the producing states, but also from the western 
supermajors, to the “New Seven Sisters”, which is a term launched by Carola 
Hoyos (2007)6. These companies are the most dominant outside the OECD-area, 
and the trend is that they are state owned (Yergin 2008, 1032; Hoyos 2007). 
NOC’s are to a greater extent dominating the world’s oil and gas markets today, 
compared to earlier. The European oil and gas industry may feel challenged by 
“The New Seven Sisters”, and in particular by Gazprom which has pushed into 
the downstream market of Europe (Hoyos 2007). Gazprom has been accused for 
operating in a divide and rule manner against its European counterparts, and has 
                                                 
6 ”The New Seven Sisters” are Saudi Aramco, Gazprom, China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC), National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), Petroleum of Venezuela, Petrobras and 
Petronas.  
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officially stated that it wants to become an international energy company 
(Gazprom 2012a). The challenge is that the European companies have to operate 
in a liberalized climate based on cooperation and interdependence, while Gazprom 
is operating under the paradigm of “resource nationalism”. In this way, one can 
argue that the European companies are competing under different rules of the 
game, compared to Gazprom and the NOCs.  
 
8.2 Internal Changes in the Industry 
Additionally, there have been internal changes, as a consequence of the 
liberalization paradigm of the Union. One example of the most liberalized market, 
is the UK energy sector, which was early liberalized, which have smaller players 
and is a more competitive market (van der Linde, de Jong and van den Heuvel 
2010, 18). This liberalized market may explain why none of the big gas utilities 
are from the UK. After the second gas directive, the European gas utilities started 
to face new realities. Stern and Rogers (2011) point to the following realities:  
- Introduction of competition meant that national monopolies would lose 
market share 
- Challenging to compete with electricity companies as these were larger 
- Transmission and distribution would still be regulated monopolies, but 
could be less profitable than before (Stern and Rogers 2011, 19).  
The consequence of the increased competition was that it lead to mergers and 
acquisitions, which caused Europe to have large integrated utility companies 
which own assets all across Europe (Stern and Rogers 2011, 19). In this way, the 
European gas companies face both internal and external competition. Among 
these utility companies are E.ON, RWE, GdFSuez, ENI, Enel.   
 
Howarth argues that there has been stalled liberalization in European energy 
markets, and that the differentiation paradigm continued with the compromise of 
the three options in the unbundling directive (2009, 135). Opponents to 
unbundling argued that large national companies were needed to balance the 
Russian gas giant Gazprom and that a debate on the ownership structure was less 
relevant (Howarth 2009, 135-136). Faced by the competition of NOCs, there have 
been disagreements on unbundling, and some have argued that it is necessary to 
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have large integrated energy companies to ensure security of supply (EurActiv 
2009a). Thus, the large European oil and gas companies fear the involvement of 
Gazprom and the challenge of the “New Seven Sisters”, while they at the same 
time face the internal drive for increased competition and liberalization.  
 
8.3 In the Event of a Crisis 
As Umbach (2010, 1229) argues, historically, at least in the old Member States, 
energy policies have been left to the industry, dominated by economic 
considerations. One example can be Germany, where the aspect of security of 
supply has been left to the utility companies (Umbach 2006, 64). In such a 
perspective, it is much up to the gas utility companies to ensure that their 
customers are supplied with sufficient quantities of gas, at affordable prices. This 
can be called the utility-approach, where the utilities are handed the 
responsibilities to ensure security of supply.  
 
One can also identify the importance of the industry in the case of supply 
disruptions. This is outlined in the directive of Security of Gas Supply, which was 
created so that the Member States within the EU can create common policies 
towards ensuring security of supply (de Jong, Wouters and Sterkx 2009, 9). In the 
case of sudden disruption in the supply of gas, the Gas Coordination Group shall 
coordinate the member states into taking the necessary measures to handle the 
disruption (EC 2004, L127/95). As a part of this process, the Gas Coordination 
Group shall (i) involve the industry for possible solutions (ii) look at the possible 
measures taken by the member states and (iii) the European Commission may take 
action (EC 2004, 9; de Jong, Wouters and Sterkx 2009, L127/95). Thus, the gas 
industry becomes the first line of defense.  
 
In the Commission report of the gas crisis of 2009, the conclusion was also that 
the industry showed willingness to deal with the problem (SEC 2009, 10-11). The 
two first weeks, the European gas and utility companies had only monitored the 
development of the conflict, but this changed in the latter part of the conflict 
(Pirani, Stern and Yafimava 2009, 47). Observers from the EU and experts from 
E.ON Ruhrgas, ENI, Gaz de France/Suez, WINGAS and Panrusgaz contributed to 
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monitor the gas flows (Gazprom 2009b). Despite this willingness, lack of 
information, shortcomings in the internal supply network within the EU and 
difference in gas standards were some of the additional challenges to the industry 
(SEC 2009, 10-11).   
 
During the crisis, when the monitoring group realized there was no gas flow to 
monitor, European gas companies were important for reaching an agreement, by 
pushing the involved parties to reach an agreement. In a meeting on January 15, 
CEO of Gazprom, Alexei Miller, Prime Minister Putin and ENI CEO Scaroni, 
there were suggestions on how to end the crisis, by inviting the European gas 
majors to contribute with the financial backing to restart the flow of gas to 
European customers (Gazprom 2009c). In this way, the consortium of European 
gas companies, which contributed by financial backing to restart the transit 
network, most likely helped to speed up the process(Pirani, Stern and Yafimava 
2009, 47-48). In another meeting, during the crisis, Scaroni and Miller discussed 
the need to diversify away from Ukraine, and how the South Stream line could be 
an important measure in this regard (Gazprom 2009a).  
 
8.4 The Effects of The Conflict on the EU Actors 
8.4.1 The European Commission 
Pirani, Stern and Yafimava argue that the European Commission played a minor 
role in finding a solution, thus the gas industry and national governments were left 
to themselves to deal with the crisis (2009, 49). De Jong, Wouters and Sterkx 
support this view, arguing that the European Commission was underperforming 
with regard to their given tasks (de Jong, Wouters and Sterkx 2009, 27). One of 
the effects of the conflict, was that it illustrated the European Commission’s 
inability to provide the necessary support in the most serious case of disruption of 
gas supplies in the history of EU. According to the Gas Directive, the 
Commission shall take action together with the Gas Coordination Group and the 
Member States during a crisis. Its minor role in the conflict can be explained by 
the fact that the Commission: 
- “had little technical capability and needs to rely on the industry for monitoring 
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capability; 
-  had little political credibility or political leverage with either Ukraine or Russia; 
- was unable or unwilling to provide the financial resources to resolve the crisis” 
(Pirani, Stern and Yafimava 2009, 49)  
This further illustrates that it is much up to the Member States to ensure energy 
security, also in the case with a serious supply disruption. Contrary to the 
Commission, European gas companies were important for reaching an agreement, 
by pushing the involved parties to reach an agreement.  
 
8.4.2 The Utility Industry 
One direct consequence of the challenge by the NOCs is that there are fewer 
opportunities left for the OECD-based companies. In an environment where 
resource nationalism is more dominant, it becomes more challenging for the 
European companies to make investments.  This can be illustrated  by BP and 
Shell’s investments in the Sakhalin II and Kovykta fields, which caused more 
challenging relations with the Russian government  (Leonard and Popescu 2007, 
42). This illustrates how the state-owned companies are operating under different 
rules than the European ones, which makes it more challenging for the latter to 
make the necessary investments. As van der Linde, de Jong and van den Heuvel 
(2010, 46) argue, the international trend of tightened energy markets have caused 
European energy companies to focus more security of supply perspective, than 
competition concerns. In this way there has been a change in strategy of the 
European companies to ensure sufficient supplies in an environment where there 
is increased competition for oil and gas resources.  The drive for competition and 
liberalization during the 1990s may have neglected the focus on security of 
supply. However, the changes in the market, the revival of Russia and conflict 
between Russia and Ukraine, may have caused a return of the focus on security of 
supply in the utility companies.  
 
Helm (2007, 38) argues that politics have become more important to ensure 
energy security. The effect of the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict may explain this 
return of politics, as there is a closer coupling between security of supply and 
politics. This can be illustrated by the symbiotic relationship between Gazprom 
and Russia during the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict, where Putin was important in 
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influencing the strategic actions made by Gazprom. In such an environment it can 
be difficult for companies alone to ensure security of supply. The Member States 
and the EU have become more active in ensuring security of supply, and 
government leaders have involved themselves to negotiate bilateral contracts (van 
der Linde, de Jong and van den Heuvel 2010, 26).  One example in this regard, 
may be the involvement of Schröder and Putin, as they involved themselves to 
develop the Nord Stream pipeline project. The resurgence of geopolitics may have 
reduced the relevance of traditional economic interests and illustrated that energy 
is not a purely economic good. In many ways the 1990s was the decade where the 
liberalization paradigm ruled, which made it easier to let private companies freely 
operate to ensure energy security. However, the return of geopolitics makes it 
more difficult for the market and European companies alone to ensure energy 
security. The return of politics into the energy sector can also make it more 
challenging to continue the liberalization of EU’s energy markets, and further 
integration within the sector, as Member States may want to be in control of the 
sector.  
 
The gas deliveries from Gazprom to the European customers are negotiated in 
long-term contracts. In this way the buyers oblige themselves to import a 
minimum amount, in take-or-pay contracts. Many of the largest European gas 
utilities have renewed their contracts with Gazprom. GdF Suez has renewed its 
gas contract until 2030, E.ON until 2035, Wintershall until 2030, ENI until 2035 
(Gazprom 2012b).  As van der Linde, de Jong and van den Heuvel (2010, 35) 
point out; “Small players generally have fewer instruments to secure supplies than 
large players”. In the negotiations of such long-term contracts, it is quite logical 
that size matters. Gazprom’s new strategy in the run-up to the Russo-Ukrainian 
gas conflict, and its willingness to put harsh measures behind this strategy, may 
have made Member States less willing to break up their national energy 
champions. This effect was seen in the unbundling directive; several Member 
States opposed the unbundling directive to break up the utility companies. 
Therefore, the effect may be that there is a reinforced will for the Member States 
to keep the national champions to ensure security of supply as a measure to 
balance the power of Gazprom.  
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8.5 Conclusion: A New Reality and the Return of Politics 
First of all, the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict has caused the reinforced the return 
of politics. The increased relevance of geopolitical considerations has downplayed 
traditional economic interests, which have caused European governments to take a 
more active role. This can be illustrated by the will to keep the national champions 
to balance the power of Gazprom, as this is seen as necessary in the negotiations 
of the long-term contracts. Secondly, the emergence of the “New Seven Sisters” 
has increased the competition for energy resources which have caused a change in 
strategy of the European utility companies. This change in strategy involves the 
change in focus from the aspect of competitiveness to security of supply. In many 
ways, the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict has contributed to challenge the 
assumptions of both Member States and the European utility companies. Energy is 
not a purely economic good and cannot solely be ensured by private companies.  
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9. Conclusion 
In chapter 4, the focus was put on the “New World of Oil”, and how this launched 
the focus on security of supply in the EU. The Commission, the governments in 
the UK, France and Germany all put focus on security of supply as a consequence 
of the changes in the oil market. This suggests that the trend was already evident 
before the disruptions of the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict. Due to the economic 
and geopolitical changes in the oil market, security of supply was put on the 
agenda as it was a more relevant concept in the 2000s than in the 1990s. The new 
oil market challenged the interests of the Member States, as they could no longer 
extract economic rents from the market, as in the 1990s. Furthermore, the 
geopolitical tensions made the strategic element of energy more visible. In this 
way, the external factors made security of supply a more important concept in the 
“New World of Oil”, which caused EU actors to focus more on this concept. 
 
In chapter 5, the Eastern enlargement was analyzed. Firstly, it further brought 
security on the supply on the agenda, because many of the new Member States are 
more dependent on Russian gas. Several of these Member States, like for example 
Poland and Lithuania want to reduce the market share of Russian gas. One 
explanation to this, is that these Member States to a greater extent base their 
interests on geopolitical considerations. Secondly, the inclusion also caused the 
EU to become more heterogeneous. The preferences of the Member States diverge 
to a greater extent after the enlargement, as the means on how to ensure energy 
security differ among the Member States. In Germany, economic interests have 
dominated the preference formation, and the private companies have been 
important to ensure security of supply. Germany has developed a strong 
partnership with Russia regarding gas supplies. In Poland, geopolitical 
considerations dominate. While the enlargement out security of supply on the 
agenda, it also caused a more heterogeneous EU.  
 
In chapter 6, the effect of the return of Russia has been analyzed. This return 
served as a wake-up call for several Member States. Historically, Russia has had 
the reputation as a reliable stable energy supplier, but this view was challenged by 
the return of Russia and the gas conflict with Ukraine. By this wake-up call, the 
return of Russia and the gas conflict with Ukraine, may have challenged the EU’s 
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and the old Member States’ traditional assumptions on energy, that it is a an 
economic good, that private companies by themselves can ensure energy security 
and that Russia will continue to be a reliable energy partner. In the new Member 
States - which have a more negative approach to Russia - the conflict reinforced 
the focus on security of supply. The reason to this, is that the conflict reinforced 
latent geopolitical considerations. In this way, through the conflict, security of 
supply became an even more important concept for many of the new Member 
States. One can argue that the conflict was a manifestation of the fears of these 
countries on the role of Russia’s role in the EU energy mix. However, even 
though the conflict was a wake-up call, there is still considerable divergence in the 
interests between some of the CEE-countries and for example Germany on the 
role of Russian energy supplies. This divergence still constitutes a hindrance for 
integration.  
  
In chapter 7, the role of Gazprom was analyzed. The dominant role of Gazprom in 
the conflict caused European actors to question the company’s role in the 
European energy mix. Through the conflict, Gazprom showed a new strategy to 
increase the profitability of the CIS-markets, and showed willingness to put strong 
measures behind this strategy. Through this mechanism, it has been illustrated a 
mismatch in interests between the liberalization paradigm of the EU and state 
interventionism in Russia, that is “resource nationalism”. This mismatch of 
interests can partly be explained by the fact that EU is import-dependent, which 
makes security of supply the relevant concept, while Russia and Gazprom is 
export-dependent, which makes security of demand the relevant concept. The 
symbiotic relationship between Russia and Gazprom is part of the wider trend 
where the state is increasingly involved in the energy sector, where NOCs 
dominate. This has caused the EU to try to limit the role of third-parties, as 
illustrated by the “Gazprom clause”. The close relationship between the Russian 
government and Gazprom, has contributed to increase the focus on security of 
supply, as the reputation of both has been challenged. If the relationship between 
these two actors had been weaker, it is questionable if the conflict would have had 
the same impact on their reputation.  
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In chapter 8, the effect on the European utilities was analyzed. These companies 
are facing external competition, through the “New Seven Sisters”, which has been 
manifested by Gazprom. This has caused an increased willingness to keep the 
national champions to balance Gazprom. In addition, the European utilities are 
facing internal changes because of privatization and liberalization. As a 
consequence of these two trends, the gas utilities have changed strategy with an 
increased focus on how to secure supplies, while the aspect of competitiveness 
has been - relatively to security of supply - downplayed. In disruption of 2009, it 
was much up to the industry in Europe to contribute to find an agreement, while 
the Commission played a minor role in finding a solution. Lastly, the changes in 
the energy markets combined with the conflict have caused a return to politics, 
where governments have taken a more active role to ensure security of supply, by 
the negotiations of bilateral contracts.  
 
Based on the findings in this thesis, the conclusion is that there was already a 
trend evident, with an increased focus on security of supply before the Russo-
Ukrainian gas conflict, as a consequence of the changes in the world’s energy 
markets. Most likely, there would have been an increased focus on security of 
supply, even without exposure to the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict. However, 
from the empirical findings, it becomes clear that the trend of a shift in approach 
towards security of supply, was reinforced by the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict, 
which strengthens H1.  
 
During the 1990s, the focus on security of supply was absent, much because of a 
favorable oil market, optimism because of the liberalization paradigm and the 
general absence of geopolitical tensions. The renewed focus on security of supply 
is evident at the end of the 1990s, which can be explained by the economic and 
geopolitical changes the oil market. Therefore, the findings suggest that the 
Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict did not happen in a vacuum. In many ways it was a 
part of a wider trend with structural changes in the world’s energy markets, with a 
surge in prices, geopolitical tensions and increased state involvement. Therefore, 
the conflict may be considered symptomatic for these structural changes in the 
market, rather than to be considered as a stand-alone conflict.  
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These external changes combined with internal changes, like the Eastern 
enlargement, have made security of supply a more important concept. For many 
of the old Member States, the conflict served as a wake-up call, while it for 
several of the  CEE- countries, was a manifestation of the geopolitical dimensions 
of energy security, and that Russia’s market share in the European energy mix, 
should be reduced. The economic assumptions on energy, which had dominated 
EU’s approach during the 1990s, were challenged as a consequence of the 
conflict, and made EU actors open their eyes, even though the European 
Commission argued the conflict was purely based on commercial interests.    
 
Therefore there has been a change in EU’s approach to energy security, with an 
increased focus on the concept of security of supply. The Member States see a 
larger role for a more coordinated approach to security of supply. Thus they can 
agree on the common goal of ensuring energy security. However, the means on 
how to ensure it diverge to a considerable degree, much because of the diverging 
interests on Russia. This is best illustrated by the diverging interests of Germany 
and Poland. Member States are reluctant to transfer competencies to the EU, 
because of the strategic dimension of energy, which causes energy policy to still 
be at the heart of the nation-state. Because security of supply is closely related to 
foreign policy, individual Member States may favor unilateral agreements with 
supplier countries, than to have a common external European energy policy. As a 
theory of integration should also be able to explain the lack of integration, the 
divergence in preferences on these matters, may, according to LI, be a 
considerable hindrance to the integration towards common energy policy.  
 
In a climate where geopolitical tensions have claimed a larger role, the EU’s 
overall energy security would be better off with a common energy policy, which 
included a common security of supply policy. The internal market alone is 
insufficient to ensure energy security, especially in a world where political and 
diplomatic skills increasingly are tools that are needed to ensure energy security. 
A common EU security of supply policy would give the Union a stronger 
bargaining position in the negotiations with supplier countries and could also 
make the Union better prepared for future supply disruptions.   
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Appendix 1: Figures 
Figure 1: Gerring’s Typologies of Case Studies  
Source: Gerring (2004, 343): 
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Figure 2: de Jong’s Three Challenges to EU’s Energy Policy  
Source: de Jong (2008, 107):  
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Figure 3: Countries affected by the supply disruption of January 2009.  
Source: Pirani, Stern and Yafimava (2009, 55-56): 
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Figure 4: Gazprom Exports in 2010 and 2011, European Market 
Source: Gazprom’s yearly report for 2011(Gazprom 2012a, 74): 
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Appendix 2: List of Abbreviations 
Bcm  Billion cubic metres 
CEE  Central and Eastern European 
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States 
ECSC  European Coal and Steel Community 
EU  European Union 
GDP  Gross domestic product 
IEA  International Energy Agency 
LI  Liberal intergovernmentalism 
LNG  Liquefied natural gas 
Mcm   Thousand cubic metres 
NOC  National oil company 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OPEC  Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
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“The diversification of gas routes and of sources of supply for the Union is 
essential for improving the security of supply of the Union as a whole and its 
Member States individually” (EU Regulation 2010: L295/2).   
 
1. 0 Introduction 
It has now been three years since the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine 
reached its climax. On 7 January, 2009, Russian gas supplies directed for Europe 
was completely shut off (Pirani et al 2009: 4).  The cutoff caused the most serious 
disruption in gas supplies in the history of the EU (European Commission 2009: 
7). Also, three years earlier, in 2006, the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine 
caused a major disruption in Russian gas supplies for Europe (Pirani et al 2009: 
12). This was the only major disruption in Russian gas supplies for the European 
market, prior to the disruptions of 2009 (Pirani et al 2009: 12).  In the light of the 
recurring gas conflicts between Ukraine and Russia, the roles of the two as stable 
energy partners have been questioned. In this preliminary thesis report, I will 
provide the framework to analyze if there has been a change in EU’s approach to 
energy security in the aftermath of the gas conflict.   
 
1.1 Research question  
When the EU established the Single European Market in 1992, actors hoped this 
introduction would also cause liberalization and influence of economic principles 
in the gas markets, thus having the same logic within the gas sector (Andersen and 
Sitter 2009: 63). Claes argues that, during the 1990s, the focus of the EU was on 
developing the internal aspects of energy security (2009: 46). The process started 
in the beginning of the 1990s, which after negotiations, culminated in the gas 
directive of 1998, where the focus was on liberalization, transmission, distribution 
and storage of natural gas (Claes 2009:46). In this way, one can argue that the 
focus of the involved actors was on economic integration, which involved 
merging national markets into a single European market for gas.  
 
The limitations this approach, from an EU perspective, is that the EU is highly 
dependent on imports to meet its energy demand. However, this might not be a 
problem, as long as the supplies are free from any major disruptions. Contrary it 
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might become problematic when the most important supplier and the most 
important transit country of gas, are having a conflict which lead to a complete 
cutoff in the gas supplies.  
 
The goal of the master thesis is to analyze if there has been a change in the EU’s 
approach to energy in the aftermath of the Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict. As of 
now, much of the focus in the public and among scholars, has been on Russia’s 
motivations for the cutoffs in gas supplies, if Russia constitutes a threat to EU 
energy security and the immediate effects on the EU member countries. Due to 
the severity of the crisis of 2009, it would be interesting to see if the conflict has 
affected EU’s approach to energy security, and if it has been a change in EU’s 
concept of energy security in the aftermath of the crisis. Based on this, I have 
formulated the following research question:  
Has the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine affected EU’s approach 
to energy security, from an economic perspective based on the single 
market to a security perspective? 
One can also use the concept of low and high politics, and ask if the concept has 
moved from low politics to high politics.  
1.2 Hypotheses 
Based on this research question, I have made two hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: 
The recurring disruptions following the gas conflict between Russia and 
Ukraine have the increased importance of the security aspect of energy 
supply.  
If there has been politicization of the concept of energy security it is natural to 
assume that this will have the following empirical consequences:  
- A politicization of the energy concept will most likely lead to increased 
importance national policies.  
- There might be increased fragmentation in national policies, as the 
politicization of the concept will cause different interpretations. 
- Increase in bilateral agreements between member states and potential 
suppliers.  
- States, rather than market actors will be at the forefront in ensuring energy 
security. 
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Alternative hypothesis:  
The gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine has not affected a change in 
EU’s approach to energy security and the concept is still based on an 
economic interpretation.  
This hypothesis will also have some empirical consequences: 
- Continued liberalization of energy markets 
- Continued merging of national energy markets into one single market.  
- Market actors rather than states will dominate the policies 
- More unity, as the energy concept is closer to low politics than to high 
politics 
 
Thus the focus will be whether the conflict has caused energy security to still be 
located within a single market type of framework, or if it has moved to be 
interpreted within “high politics”, as a consequence of the recurring gas 
disruptions.  
 
 
 2.0 Methodological approach 
There are several reasons for why this particular conflict is relevant. First of all, 
Russia is considered to be a energy superpower, and Russia is the most important 
supplier of gas to Europe, as Russia, in 2008, accounted for 31, 5 % of total gas 
imports to Europe (Eurostat 2011). Therefore, due to the importance of Russian 
supplies, it is logical to assume that Russia’s actions will also affect EU actors and 
their approach to energy security. Secondly, the disruption of 2009 was, as 
mentioned, the most severe in the history of the EU. A disruption at this scale will 
have huge and immediate negative effects on EU energy security. Thus, due to the 
severity of the crisis, the role of Russia and Ukraine as energy partners has been 
questioned, which also may cause a change in EU’s approach to energy security. 
Thirdly, if this conflict represents a new Russian strategy of using gas as a 
political weapon, the internal market logic may be insufficient to deal with such a 
problem, as the risks are found outside the union. According to Jonathan Stern, 
Russia has, before 2009, proven to be a reliable gas supplier (Ringmar 2005:19). 
However, the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine has challenged the 
understanding of Russia as a stable energy supplier, thus this conflict might 
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illustrate a turning point not only in Russian politics, but also in EU’s approach to 
energy security.  
 
As the goal of this research project is to analyze the EU’s approach to energy 
security in the light of the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine, I have 
assumed the following causal relationship:  
Gas conflict  politicization of energy security  from single market to 
differentiated national approaches   
The logic behind this causal relationship is that the conflict, due to its severity, 
might thus have caused a politicization of the concept of energy security, and 
moved it from “low politics” into “high politics”. In this way, other tools become 
important and there will be an increased divergence in member states’ 
preferences.  
 
In the research work, I will use a qualitative approach, where I will mostly be 
using textual analysis of news articles, journal articles, books about the topic, EU 
treaties and directives, statements of relevant actors and national policy directives. 
It will most likely be a interpretive case study, where theory is to provide 
analytical tools to explain the mechanisms at work and to help explaining if there 
has been a change in EU’s energy security (Vennesson 2008:226).  
 
 
3.0 Theoretical Framework: Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
As a methodological tool to analyze if there has been a change in the EU’s 
approach to energy security, I will use Liberal Intergovernmentalism.  There are 
several relevant theories that can be applied to analyze these mechanisms, but 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism, might be the most relevant framework for 
analyzing the mechanisms in this thesis project. 
 
First of all, Liberal Intergovernmentalism makes two important assumptions about 
politics. The first one is states are actors and institutions are tools where the states 
reach their goals by intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009: 68). The second assumption is that states are rational, 
which means that states calculate the different alternatives and choose the 
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alternative that maximizes utility (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 68). 
Further it involves a three-step model which involves:  
“(1)liberal theory of national preference formation with (2) an intergovernmental 
model of EU-level bargaining, and (3) a model of institutional choice 
emphasizing the role of international institutions in providing ‘credible 
commitments’ for member governments” (Pollack 2010: 20).  
 
When it comes to the national preference formation, these can vary within and 
between states, both over time and across issues (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 
2009: 69). Thus the priority of goals may vary within nation states over time, as 
well as the goals may differ from state to state. Further national preferences are 
based on “issue-specific” preferences, which means that different interests will 
dominate depending on the issue at stake (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 
70). In economical issues, the preferences will be dependent on the equilibrium 
within the state, which is decided by the producer interests on the one hand, and 
taxpayers and the ones that favors regulation, on the other (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009: 70). In non-economic areas the issues may be dominated 
by other concerns (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 70).  
 
The theory is also one which includes intergovernmental bargaining. The outcome 
of bargaining depends on the relative bargaining power of the actors (Moravcsik 
and Schimmelfennig 2009: 71). Following Liberal Intergovernmentalism, 
asymmetrical interdependence and information about preferences and agreements 
play an important role in the bargaining process (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 
2009: 71). Asymmetrical interdependence is defined as the unevenly distribution 
of benefits of a special agreement (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 71). 
Further, this bargaining position is compared to other outside options, like for 
example unilateral agreements (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 71). From 
this implies that actors, who have least to gain from cooperation and actors with 
more information, have a stronger bargaining position (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009: 71).  
 
The third aspect is the inclusion of institutional choice. Institutions can be the 
tools of member states to cope with unpredicted and unforeseen challenges 
(Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 72). Institutions contribute to reduce the 
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transaction costs of continued negotiations on specific issues and ensure credible 
commitments of the pre-existing bargain (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 
72; Pollack 2010: 20).  
 
Even though critics have argued that Liberal Intergovernmentalism cannot be 
applied in everyday decision-making, Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig argue that 
this is not the case (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 773-74). Even though 
they emphasize that the theory is best applied on the big treaty changes, it can still 
be applied at everyday decisions, because many of the decisions within the EU are 
taken by consensus or unanimity (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 74).  
 
It is especially the emphasis on states as actors and national preference formation 
that are most relevant for this thesis. The theory can contribute to explain the logic 
behind the change where energy moves from being an economic issue to become 
more politicized. Because of this emphasis, Liberal Intergovernmentalism can 
contribute to explain the diverging interests among the member states in the 
energy issue. It can also explain integration and cooperation in the logic of the 
internal market, but also disintegration, if energy security to a greater extent has 
been politicized. It is easier to make bargains and make this credible through the 
institutional mechanisms, when there is convergence in national preferences 
regarding energy security. Oppositely, there will be more difficult to make such 
agreements when there is diverging interests and different interpretations of the 
concept, especially if the concept has entered the sphere of high politics.  
 
Two concepts that can be combined with this framework and be relevant in 
understanding the divergence in national preferences, are sensitivity and 
vulnerability. Sensitivity means how fast changes in one country leads to costly 
effects in another country (Keohane and Nye 1989: 12). Vulnerability is the 
degree of availability and costliness of other alternatives, which the actor face, 
after the actor has changed its policy, to adapt to the costs imposed on the actor 
(Keohane and Nye 1989: 13). Applying these concepts to gas supplies, sensitivity 
involves disruptions in existing supplies; while vulnerability involves long term gas 
supplies (Austvik 2009:89).  These two concepts may indicate the dependence on 
Russian gas supplies, which may vary greatly between the member states.   
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4.0 Relevant literature  
4.1 Defining energy security  
A broad and widely accepted definition of energy security is sufficient supply of 
energy at a reasonable price (De Jong et al 2009: 4; Yergin 2006: 70-71; IEA 
2011). This definition focuses on the supply side of energy, and it is possible to 
divide energy security into security of demand and security of supply (Fermann 
2009: 24-25). As the focus on of this thesis will be on EU’s approach to energy 
security, it is the security of supply that is most relevant. This can be explained by 
the fact that EU imports 50% of its energy, and this is forecasted to rise to 65% in 
2030, if nothing changes the current trend (Fermann 2009:24). As of 2006, the EU 
imports about 82% of the oil consumption and 57 % of its gas consumption, and 
this is likely to rise to 93% of oil consumption and 84% of gas consumption 
(Fermann 2009:24).     
 
Securing energy supplies is important, because energy – thus also gas – is 
perceived as a strategic resource (Fermann 2009:11). That is, energy is a 
precondition for achieving important politico-economic goals. Thus ensuring 
energy security is necessary to achieve goals within the economy, industry, labor, 
consumption and also external security (Fermann 2009:11). Already in the build 
up to the First World War, Winston Churchill, emphasized the importance of 
ensuring energy supply, to compete with the German navy (Yergin 2006:69). 
 
It is also possible to divide the concept of energy security of supply into short 
term and long term. Short term risks involve disruptions in supply or the transit of 
supplies, due to political factors, disasters and extreme weather conditions 
(Austvik 2009:88). Long term risks to security of supply involve one cannot get 
access to meet increasing demand, because of economic or political reasons 
(Austvik 2009: 88). 
 
The additional challenge with ensuring gas security of supply is that the supply is 
to a large extent regional, in contradiction to oil, where there is an integrated 
world market (Correljé and van der Linde 2006: 534-535). Thus a disruption may 
cause a direct reduction in security of supply, rather than work through the price 
mechanism (Correljé and van der Linde 2006: 534-535). 
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4.2 Background to the conflict 
Through the 2000s, Russia experienced a 7% growth on average per year, until 
the country was hit by the financial crisis in 2009 (Blakkisrud 2009). This growth 
was fueled by general boom in commodity prices, also in fossil fuels, like oil and 
gas. The price of oil went from 12 dollars per barrel in 1998 to almost 150 dollars 
per barrel in the summer of 2008 (Blakkisrud 2009). The steady increase in oil 
prices also affected the gas prices for the deliveries for Europe, as the price of gas 
is made out of a formula that is based on the price of oil (Pirani et al 2009: 7). 
 
As both Russia and Ukraine struggled after the fall of the Soviet Union, cheap, 
subsidized Russian gas was crucial for the Ukrainian economy, while the gas 
export to the European market, through the Ukrainian transit network was 
important for the Russian economy (Pirani et al 2009: 5). Problems started in the 
1990s when Ukraine did not pay for the highly subsidized gas, which lead to 
accumulation of debt and Russian pressure for ownership in the transit networks 
(Pirani et al 2009: 5). With the increase in energy prices, the difference between 
gas prices for the European market and the subsidized Ukrainian gas, increased 
through the 2000s (Pirani et al 2009: 7). Gazprom wanted that the prices for the 
Ukrainian market, and the other CIS-countries should be increased, which 
culminated in the gas conflict of 2006 (Pirani et al 2009: 7). Even though the 
reductions of 2006 affected the European market, it was not until 2009 the gas 
dispute between Russia and Ukraine reached its climax. 
 
4.3 The conflict: economically or politically motivated?  
There have been discussions whether the recurring conflicts may be a threat to EU 
energy security, or not. One suggestion to the recurring disruptions has been that 
Russia is using gas as a political weapon. One scholar, who holds this view, is 
Godzimirski, who argues that Russia is willing to sacrifice income from the gas 
exports for the reaching political goals (Bakken 2009). The agreement between 
Russia and Ukraine to extend the Russian lending agreement of the Black Sea 
naval base, Sevastopol, in return for 30% discount on Russian gas for Ukraine, 
may highlight the political aspect (Pirani et al 2009:12; Pirani et al 2010: 2). 
Godzimirski also argues that the Russian state will try to use it as a foreign policy 
tool: ”(…) the Russian state will retain control of the sector and will use it as a 
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strategic tool not only on the domestic scene, but also in reshaping Russia’s 
relations with the outside world” (Godzimirski 2009: 179). If it is used as a 
political weapon, then this might symbolize a larger threat to EU energy security 
compared to if the conflict was caused by other motivations.   
 
Jonathan Stern, holds a different view than Godzimirski, and argues that the 
political aspect of the crisis is exaggerated, the threat towards EU’s energy 
security is exaggerated and that there is a tendency to undermine the economical 
aspect of the gas conflict between Ukraine and Russia (Ringmar 2005: 19; Stern 
2007: 88;90). From this point of view, the conflict was rather a consequence of 
Ukraine’s inability to pay for their gas deliveries. In addition, Russia is dependent 
on the gas deliveries for Europe. An example of the importance of the economic 
aspects of the gas deliveries can be illustrated by some numbers. 98% of Russian 
gas exports are exported to the European market (Fermann 2009:26). In 2007, 53, 
4% of Russia’s export earnings came from export to the EU (Fermann 2009:26). 
Russia is dependent on Ukraine for the gas deliveries for Europe, since 80 % of 
the gas exported to Europe, is exported through Ukraine (Pirani et al 2009:5). The 
problem has been that there are few real alternatives to the transit network through 
Ukraine, due to bilateral characterization of the gas markets (Goldthau 2008: 686). 
Further, Goldthau, argues there are more prominent challenges regarding Russian 
gas supplies, than the willingness to use gas as a political weapon (2008:686).  
 
4.4 Short term effects of the conflict 
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia were the hardest hit among EU member states 
(Pirani et al 2009: 53; Kovacevic 2009: 2-3). Slovakia is dependent on gas for 
electricity generation, and the disruption in supplies strained the network 
(European Commission 2009: 15). Bulgaria and Romania are sensitive to 
disruptions in the gas supplies from Russia, due to the high import dependence. 
However, Kovacevic argues that even though the situation was difficult in the 
region, many of the countries were “lucky” because domestic demand was lower 
than usual due to holiday season, the effects of the financial crisis and other 
reasons, and the hydropower production was large due to weather conditions 
(2009: 18-19). 
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Outside the mentioned countries, the disruption in gas supplies did not cause the 
same implications, and especially north-west Europe was not much affected of the 
disruption (Pirani et al 2009: 53-55). This region has a lower degree of sensitivity. 
The lower degree of sensitivity may be explained by larger diversification both in 
regard to suppliers and fuels, but also the increased possibility to use strategic 
energy reserves (Pirani et al 2009:53-55) Industrial demand was lower than usual, 
much because of the financial crisis, which caused the countries to have larger 
reserves than usual (Piriani et al 2009:55-56). Thus, luck can also have been 
explanatory factor for the limited implications in the western part of Europe. 
 
The most serious implication may be that the reputation of Russia and Ukraine as 
reliable energy partners experienced a serious damage. Thus the future view of 
Russia as a stable energy supplier may be dependent on Gazprom’s willingness to 
take measures to reduce the dependency on the Ukrainian transit network (Pirani 
et al 2009: 57). Therefore, the gas conflict of 2009 symbolized the severe negative 
effects of a disruption at this scale may cause. This happened during the midst of 
the winter and it affected ordinary European citizens.  
 
4.5 Two alternative scenarios of the way ahead: Markets and Institutions and 
Regions and Empires 
Correlje and Van der Linde argue that actors will respond to the changes in the 
energy market (2006: 535). Further they make two scenarios for the future energy 
markets. These two are Markets and Institutions and Regions and Empires.  The 
Markets and Institution scenario assumes that there will be a further integration of 
the world’s energy markets, where international institutions play an important role 
in facilitating cooperation (Correlje and Van der Linde 2006: 535). International 
institutions will also to a greater extent manage to deal with conflicts (Correlje 
and Van der Linde 2006: 535). Under this scenario, there will also be increased 
liberalization of markets which will facilitate increased flow of goods, capital and 
people under the influence of market forces with backing of international 
institutions  (Correlje and Van der Linde 2006: 535).  For EU, this is the best case 
scenario, and it will be easier to deal with supply risks and disruption, especially 
because this will imply a deepening of the integration with Russia (Correlje and 
Van der Linde 2006: 535-536).  
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In Regions and Empires scenario, there is a more pessimistic view on the 
developments of the international system. This involves a division of the world 
into blocks, where the political and military aspects become more important 
(Correlje and Van der Linde 2006: 536). Security and conflicts will make 
economic integration more difficult, and the lack of integrated markets for 
strategic goods, like energy, will foster bilateral agreements and relationships 
(Correlje and Van der Linde 2006: 536). Regions and states will compete for 
energy resources and markets, due to the lack of integration and firms will be 
based on a national focus (Correlje and Van der Linde 2006: 536).  
 
In both scenarios, the role of Russia is vital, because it is the only empire that can 
export extensive amount of oil and gas (Correlje and Van der Linde 2006: 536). 
However there is an important difference in the two scenarios. In the Markets ad 
Institutions scenario, Russia will be more integrated with the EU, while in the 
Regions and Empires scenario, Russia will to a larger have great power ambitions 
(Correlje and Van der Linde 2006: 536). In the last one, energy can be interpreted 
as a political weapon, which may increase the risks of disruptions in energy 
supplies.  
 
What is interesting in the regard of this work by Correlje and Van der Linde, is 
that three years later, a conflict between Russia and Ukraine regarding gas 
contracts and transit deals, caused the most severe disruption of gas supplies in the 
history of the EU. Therefore these two scenarios are highly relevant in discussing 
if the conflict has contributed to the change in EU policy. An important difference 
between the two scenarios is whether markets or states are the important device in 
coordinating energy policies (Van der Linde et al 2004: 85). There is a 
relationship between the importance of markets and an economical interpretation 
of energy security and a relationship between the importance of states and a 
politicized interpretation.  
 
 
5.0 Data 
As mentioned earlier, I will base my thesis on textual analysis. In order to find out 
if there has been a change in EU’s approach to energy security, I have to establish 
how the concept was prior to the gas conflict. It is natural to start with EU 
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documents that deal with energy supplies. As security of gas supplies is the focus 
of this thesis, the Council Directive of 2004 that defines how to ensure the 
security of gas supplies will be relevant (Council Directive 2004). The Security of 
Gas Supply Directive was created so that the member states within the EU can 
create common policies towards ensuring security of supply (De Jong et al 2009: 
9).  It is possible to compare this directive with the EU regulation on the security 
of gas supplies of 2010 (EU Regulation 2010). Thus it can be possible to analyze 
if there has been a change in the approach to security of gas supplies. Also 
national documents on energy policies can be relevant as source of information.  
 
Books on the topic can also be highly relevant, especially on the development 
before the crisis. One example is the one edited by Gunnar Fermann, named 
Political Economy of Energy in Europe, which includes several interesting 
contributions.  
 
The EU has also made an assessment of the gas disruptions of 2009, in which the 
institution outlines the background of the crisis, how EU managed to respond to 
the crisis, the lessons learned and the future way to ensure gas security of supply 
(European Commission 2009). Oxford Institute of Energy Studies has also made 
several assessments of the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and can thus 
be a source of valuable information.  
 
Several academic journals may be highly relevant for data gathering. For example 
Energy Policy, Journal of Common Market Studies and Journal of European 
Public Policy may be relevant for finding updated articles about the topic. In these 
it is possible to trace the developments of concepts, trends and theory.   
 
Other valuable sources of data can be found in news articles, which can be 
relevant for finding statements and opinions of the involved decision-makers. 
Newspapers like Financial Times can be a source of solid and valuable 
information. EurActiv and Factiva can also be relevant sources for statements, 
news and summaries. In this way it can be possible to trace the developments over 
time and see what important actors have said about the topic.  
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When it comes to analyzing the data, it is necessary to introduce the EU’s concept 
of energy security prior to the gas conflict. Then it will be necessary to analyze if 
the concept has changed after the gas conflict. Further the concepts of 
vulnerability and sensitivity can be useful in analyzing the different interests and 
preferences among the member states. These two concepts might illustrate the 
difference in dependence on Russian gas supplies, which may explain divergent 
interests among the member states.  In this regard, one explanation of the shift in 
the concept of energy security can be that the gas conflict highlighted the 
differences in vulnerability and sensitivity.  
 
Further on, it is necessary to identify the key actors and the changes in their 
preferences.  Here the two mentioned scenarios of Markets and Institutions and 
Regions and Empires together with Liberal Intergovernmentalism can be 
combined. If there has been a change from market actors to states, this might 
indicate a politicization of the energy security issue, as this indicates that other 
interests than economic ones, have become important.  The relationship between 
nation states and the industry may be an indicator of the degree of politicization. 
An example of politicization is nationalization of energy companies. In addition, it 
is necessary to look at the different EU institutions and their role in the decision-
making process regarding energy issues, and how these were involved in the 
process before and after the crisis.  
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